TCUEC - Department of Homeland Security Counter-MANPADS Program Summary

This is the text only of the "suppressed" DHS Man Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) report scrubbed from the Federation of American Scientists website, retrieved from the Google cache on 15 August 2006. We've removed the Google header, changed the page title to better reflect the page contents, and added the ads immediately below. Get it here while you can...

Page 1

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Department of

Homeland Security

Counter-MANPADS

Program Summary

EPORT

ONGRESS

ETAILING

HASES

AND

II F

INDINGS

OUNTER

-MANPADS P

ROGRAM

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Science and Technology Directorate

July 2006

Page 2

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DHS C

OUNTER

-MANPADS P

ROGRAM

HASE

II R

EPORT

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ABLE OF

ONTENTS

Executive Summary........................................................................................................................ v

Overall Assessment.................................................................................................................... vi

Performance........................................................................................................................... vi

Suitability............................................................................................................................... vi

Cost .......................................................................................................................................vii

Deployment Risks...................................................................................................................... ix

Future Plans ................................................................................................................................ x

1 Introduction............................................................................................................................. 1

1.1 Background...................................................................................................................... 2

1.1.1 Threat.......................................................................................................................... 2

1.1.2 National Strategy ........................................................................................................ 4

1.2 The DHS Counter-MANPADS Program......................................................................... 4

1.2.1 Program Strategy ........................................................................................................ 5

1.2.2 Technical Considerations............................................................................................ 5

1.2.3 External Coordination................................................................................................. 6

1.2.4 Use of Other Transaction Authority ........................................................................... 7

1.3 Legacy IRCM Systems.................................................................................................... 8

1.4 Report Structure............................................................................................................... 8

2 System Requirements and Descriptions................................................................................ 10

2.1 Military Versus Commercial Environments.................................................................. 10

2.2 System Requirements..................................................................................................... 11

2.3 System Descriptions....................................................................................................... 13

2.3.1 BAE Systems: JETEYE™ System Overview ......................................................... 15

2.3.2 Northrop Grumman Corporation: The Guardian™ System .................................... 16

3 System Performance ............................................................................................................. 17

3.1 System Engineering Management ................................................................................. 17

3.2 System Engineering Process.......................................................................................... 18

3.2.1 System Requirements, Design Analysis, and Trade Studies .................................... 18

3.2.2 System Engineering Technical Control.................................................................... 18

3.3 System Verification: Design & Performance Evaluations............................................ 20

3.3.1 Modeling and Simulation.......................................................................................... 20

3.3.2 Developmental Verification Testing......................................................................... 21

3.3.3 Hardware-in-the-Loop Testing ................................................................................. 21

3.3.4 Flight Tests................................................................................................................ 22

3.3.5 Functional and Physical Configuration Audits......................................................... 23

3.4 System Assessment........................................................................................................ 24

4 Air Carrier Suitability ........................................................................................................... 25

4.1 Aircraft Compatibility.................................................................................................... 25

4.1.1 Fleet Assessment....................................................................................................... 25

4.1.2 Environmental Qualification Assessments............................................................... 26

4.1.3 FAA Certification ..................................................................................................... 27

4.2 Air Carrier Operations ................................................................................................... 30

4.2.1 Minimizing Impact to Airline Operations................................................................. 30

Page 3

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DHS C

OUNTER

-MANPADS P

ROGRAM

HASE

II R

EPORT

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

4.2.2 Operational Logistics Support .................................................................................. 33

4.2.3 Maintenance Approach............................................................................................. 35

4.2.4 Reliability.................................................................................................................. 35

4.3 System Safety................................................................................................................. 37

4.4 System Security ............................................................................................................. 39

4.5 Emergency Ground Notification.................................................................................... 39

4.6 Assessment and Future Plans......................................................................................... 40

5 Cost Considerations .............................................................................................................. 42

5.1 Top-Level Cost Thresholds............................................................................................ 43

5.1.1 Total Acquisition Cost for Equipping 1000 Aircraft................................................ 44

5.1.2 Average O&S Cost for Operating 1,000 Aircraft..................................................... 44

5.2 Assumptions and Conditions ......................................................................................... 44

5.3 Acquisition Cost............................................................................................................. 46

5.3.1 Definition of Acquisition Cost.................................................................................. 46

5.3.2 Acquisition Cost Drivers........................................................................................... 46

5.3.3 Acquisition Cost Estimate (For Equipping 1,000 Aircraft)...................................... 48

5.3.4 Average Unit Production Cost.................................................................................. 50

5.3.5 Acquisition Cost Sensitivities................................................................................... 52

5.4 Operations and Support Costs (1,000 Aircraft) ............................................................. 53

5.4.1 Definition of Operations and Support....................................................................... 53

5.4.2 Operations and Support Cost Drivers....................................................................... 53

5.4.3 Operations and Support Cost Metrics....................................................................... 55

5.4.4 Operations and Support Costs Sensitivities.............................................................. 57

5.5 Potential Deployment Alternatives................................................................................ 57

5.5.1 Example Deployment Quantities.............................................................................. 57

5.5.2 Cost Metrics for Example Deployment Quantities................................................... 59

5.5.3 Budget Requirements................................................................................................ 60

5.6 Cost-related Conclusions & Recommendations ............................................................ 60

6 Deployment Risks & Concerns............................................................................................. 62

6.1 Technical Risks & Concerns.......................................................................................... 62

6.1.1 System Performance Tradeoffs................................................................................. 62

6.1.2 Spiral Upgrades......................................................................................................... 63

6.2 Policy Risks & Concerns............................................................................................... 64

6.2.1 Export Control .......................................................................................................... 64

6.2.2 Liability and Insurance Considerations .................................................................... 66

6.2.3 Role of DHS in Certifying Other Countermeasure Solutions................................... 67

6.2.4 Deployment Factors.................................................................................................. 68

6.2.5 International Considerations and Ramifications....................................................... 69

7 Summary............................................................................................................................... 70

7.1 Phase III Future Plans.................................................................................................... 70

7.1.1 System Performance ................................................................................................. 71

7.1.2 Air Carrier Suitability............................................................................................... 71

7.1.3 Cost........................................................................................................................... 71

7.1.4 Resolving Barriers & Constraints............................................................................. 71

Page 4

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DHS C

OUNTER

-MANPADS P

ROGRAM

HASE

II R

EPORT

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

iii

7.2 Aircraft Protection Program........................................................................................... 71

Acronyms...................................................................................................................................... 73

List of Figures

Figure 1. Air Travel is Rebounding from the Effects of September 11

.........................................2

Figure 2. Typical Commercial Aircraft Heat Sources....................................................................3

Figure 3. Three-Pronged Approach to Countering the MANPADS Threat ....................................4

Figure 4. External Coordination Key to Counter-MANPADS Program Success ...........................7

Figure 5. BAE JETEYE™ Distributed Design as Installed on an American Airlines B767 ........15

Figure 6. BAE JETEYE™ Distributed Design Components ........................................................15

Figure 7. NGC Guardian™ System Pod Installed on a FedEx MD-11.........................................16

Figure 8. NGC Guardian™ System Pod without Cover................................................................16

Figure 9. Classic System Engineering Process Focuses on Iterative Analyses & Trade

Studies................................................................................................................................18

Figure 10. System Engineering Process Flow & Verification Strategy.........................................20

Figure 11. HITL Test Matrix Missile Launch Locations...............................................................22

Figure 12. Counter-MANPADS Technology has Achieved TRL 7..............................................24

Figure 13. U.S. Commercial Fleet Distributions ...........................................................................30

Figure 13. Total Acquisition Cost Breakout for 1000 Aircraft......................................................49

Figure 14. Cost Per Installed Units................................................................................................52

Figure 15. Operations and Support Cost Breakout........................................................................54

List of Tables

Table 1. Comparison of Military Versus Commercial Environments...........................................11

Table 2. Summary of System Performance Parameters.................................................................12

Table 3. Summary of Operations and Supportability Performance Parameters............................13

Table 4. Summary of Cost Performance Parameters.....................................................................13

Table 5. Documentation Required by DHS from Contractors.......................................................17

Table 6. Environmental Qualification Testing Categories ............................................................26

Table 7. STC Process and Status Summary...................................................................................28

Table 8. Aircraft Maintenance and Service Plan...........................................................................32

Table 9. Operational Logistics Support Elements and Contractor Approaches ............................34

Table 10. Approaches to Maintenance Elements...........................................................................35

Table 11. Phase II System Safety Findings ...................................................................................39

Table 12. Top-Level Cost Thresholds ...........................................................................................43

Table 13. SPO Counter-MANPADS Baseline Acquisition Estimate............................................44

Table 14. SPO Counter-MANPADS Baseline O&S Estimate ......................................................44

Table 15. Phase II Summary of Cost Estimating Considerations..................................................45

Table 16. Counter-MANPADS System Acquisition Cost Estimates ............................................48

Table 17. Average Unit Production Cost.......................................................................................50

Table 18. Cost Improvement Curve Applied to Average Unit Production Cost...........................53

Table 19. Counter-MANPADS System Operations & Support Cost Estimates............................54

Table 20. Operations & Support Cost Metric (1,000 Passenger Aircraft).....................................56

Page 5

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DHS C

OUNTER

-MANPADS P

ROGRAM

HASE

II R

EPORT

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Table 21. Total O&S Cost Sensitivities (1,000 Passenger Aircraft)..............................................57

Table 22. Annual Order Profile for 100 Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) Aircraft.......................58

Table 23. Annual Order Profile for 600 Wide-body Passenger Aircraft.......................................59

Table 24. Annual Order Profile for 3,900 Passenger Aircraft (exclusive of Regional

Jets/Turbo-props) – Aggressive Schedule .........................................................................59

Table 25. Average Unit Cost [Constant GFY03$M].....................................................................60

Table 26. Flights per Year Breakdown..........................................................................................60

Table 27. Average O&S Cost Per Aircraft Per Year [Constant GFY03$] ....................................60

Page 6

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DHS C

OUNTER

-MANPADS P

ROGRAM

HASE

II R

EPORT

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Executive Summary

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate con-

ducted an aggressive 24-month prototype development program to demonstrate the technical fea-

sibility, assess total ownership costs, and evaluate the effectiveness of adapting military tech-

nologies to protect commercial aircraft against the threat of Man-Portable Air Defense Systems

(MANPADS). This report summarizes the results achieved over the past two years, including an

assessment of deployment considerations as well as the risks that remain before implementation

in a commercial aviation environment can be realized in a cost-effective and practical manner.

The strategy of the Counter-MANPADS program is to demonstrate proven military technology

in the commercial aviation environment through a rigorous systems engineering process and an

aggressive system development, demonstration, and evaluation program. In early 2004, DHS se-

lected three industry teams with the most mature technologies to participate in the first six-month

phase to produce preliminary designs, initial cost tradeoffs, technology transition plans, and con-

cepts of operation. BAE Systems (BAE) and Northrop Grumman Corporation (NGC) offered

electro-optical missile detection solutions using a laser-based technology known as Directed In-

frared Countermeasures (DIRCM). United Airlines offered a hybrid radar and electro-optical de-

tection solution with a flare-based countermeasure. The latter approach was not sufficiently ma-

ture to advance to Phase II because the integration of radar and electro-optical technologies had

not been accomplished; hence, the approach presented significant technical risks.

In August 2004, DHS selected BAE and NGC to continue with the 18-month Phase II system

development and demonstration program. The Counter-MANPADS System Program Office’s

(SPO) engineering team and the selected contractors used a rigorous systems engineering process

to transform commercial aviation operational needs into system performance, operations and

support, and cost requirements. The SPO pursued comprehensive assessments of the:

• Performance of military technology adapted for commercial aircraft by designing, de-

veloping, fabricating, testing, and evaluating systems for commercial operations.

• Suitability of the technology in terms of:

Operations and maintenance in the commercial aviation environment;

Operations within the National Airspace System (NAS);

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airworthiness certification; and

Critical military technology protection.

• Cost of developing, installing, and supporting a Counter-MANPADS solution in the

commercial aviation environment.

Page 7

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DHS C

OUNTER

-MANPADS P

ROGRAM

HASE

II R

EPORT

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Overall Assessment

Performance

DHS and Phase II contractors BAE and NGC demonstrated adaptations of the military’s DIRCM

technology on commercial aircraft during this program. Emerging results from analysis of the

available data indicate that the prototype units are capable of partially meeting the DHS perform-

ance requirements. Some limitations are noted in adapting the technology for commercial use.

However, all testing is not yet complete, and further analysis of integration complexities is still

required prior to a definitive final assessment.

Initial performance assessments indicate that a Counter-MANPADS system in either a distrib-

uted or pod configuration can protect commercial aircraft selected and tested during Phase II.

Additional design, development, test, and actual operation in the commercial environment is

needed to improve reliability, reduce drag and weight, incorporate technology protection, en-

hance producibility, and incorporate additional event notification capabilities. If narrow-body

and regional jets are to be equipped to protect against Counter-MANPADS, further design re-

finements, integration, and tests must be undertaken.

Suitability

It is feasible to transition selected military technology to the commercial aviation environment,

but it is challenging from logistics, cost, export control, and, to some extent, from a liability per-

spective. DHS and Phase II contractors conducted limited ground and flight testing within the

commercial airline environment. Although no significant physical aircraft compatibility issues

for proposed prototypes presented barriers to deployment to date, a number of policy, technology

protection, and international access issues have been identified.

Both contractors, with help from their airline partners, documented conceptual processes for

supporting different aircraft operators in the commercial aviation environment. Depot and inven-

tory management facilities may need to be expanded to accommodate increased workload for

Counter-MANPADS component repairs and to support related aspects of their domestic and in-

ternational operations.

Two different configurations, a Boeing 767 and a McDonnell Douglas MD-11, are on track for

Supplemental Type Certificates (STC) to be issued during 2006. An STC for a Counter-

MANPADS installation on a Boeing 747 is anticipated by the end of summer 2006. These STCs

are necessary for Phase III operational evaluations; they will be based on the FAA’s airworthi-

ness evaluation and a provisional certification approval for operational evaluation by DHS. In

addition they will have limitations regarding their operational use. It should be noted that these

three aircraft types represent only five percent of the domestic-US commercial fleet. If produc-

tion deployment is considered, separate certifications will be required for other aircraft types

(e.g., Boeing 777, Airbus 380) and series (e.g., Boeing 737-500, Boeing 737-700), and the STCs

will require DHS approvals of the equipment’s functionality and effectiveness. The two contrac-

Page 8

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DHS C

OUNTER

-MANPADS P

ROGRAM

HASE

II R

EPORT

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

vii

tor teams have conducted extensive fleet surveys to identify potential FAA certification issues

and costs associated with fleet-wide application.

The Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies (SAFETY) Act of 2002 and

the Terrorism Risk Insurance Revision Act of 2005 help, but do not address all liability issues

relating to deployment of these Counter-MANPADS systems, regardless of ownership, causing

concern for the airlines and/or their contract maintenance partners.

DHS has been working closely with the Department of State (DoS) and the Department of De-

fense (DoD) to protect critical military technology used for Counter-MANPADS equipment on

commercial aircraft. The contractors have each produced security management plans that iden-

tify the technologies requiring protection, the logistics associated with protective measures, and

recommendations for technical approaches to mitigate vulnerabilities and reduce the cost of

compliance with the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and its associated International Traffic in

Arms Regulations (ITAR). Protecting the underlying military technology in a commercial envi-

ronment is challenging and will need to be addressed in a global manner if Counter-MANPADS

units are deployed in a commercial environment.

Commercial air carriers must be able to integrate Counter-MANPADS equipment into their op-

erations. Each contractor developed Operations and Maintenance (O&M) procedures to mini-

mize the operating cost burden, taking into consideration these O&M procedures need to remain

consistent with current commercial aviation practices. There are substantial affordability impli-

cations raised by the proposed prototype units. The risk remains moderate to high that the com-

mercial airlines’ economic business model, which emphasizes high reliability and low cost,

would be adversely impacted by the current prototypes. Reduction of these risks will be pursued

in Phase III.

Cost

Development, acquisition, operations, and maintenance costs depend on acquisition strategies

and deployment policies. During Phase II, various acquisition and deployment scenarios were

explored. DHS estimates that at least one of the two current contractors is capable of achieving a

cost goal of $1 million for the 1,000

installed unit. However, competition will play an

important role in achieving targeted prices, and the contractors must still achieve targeted

efficiencies. DHS further projects that the original operations and support cost threshold of $300

per flight can no longer be met for installed Counter-MANPADS equipment. This is due to re-

cent increases in fuel costs, which have more than doubled since Phase I, increasing the contribu-

tion of fuel to O&S costs from 35 percent to about 50 percent. With inflation and increased fuel

costs, the projected cost per flight for a fleet of 1,000 aircraft averages $365 per flight.

The dollar amounts used in this section are FY03 dollars and have not been adjusted for inflation. For the sake of

consistency throughout Phases I and II of the Program, it was agreed to continue to use FY03 dollars.

Page 9

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DHS C

OUNTER

-MANPADS P

ROGRAM

HASE

II R

EPORT

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

viii

Compliance with AECA and ITAR, in their current form, is a potential cost driver and may serve

as a potential barrier to deployment of this technology to the commercial aviation industry for

OCONUS flights.

As more Counter-MANPADS equipment is ordered and installed, the average cost per unit de-

creases due to efficiency gains in the production process. Figure E-1 shows the costs for procur-

ing and installing the equipment (A-kits and B-kits) only; it does not include costs of STCs re-

quired by the FAA, initial spares, or facility costs. A-kits are the permanent installation hard-

ware on the aircraft (wiring, cables, etc.) and B-kits are made up of the countermeasures hard-

ware and software (sensors, support electronics, etc.).

NOTE: The Widebody Sample includes a mix of passenger and cargo aircraft. “Baseline” refers to a mix of wide- and nar-

row-body aircraft. “All Passenger” does not include regional jets.

Figure E-1. Average Procurement Costs

The average Operations and Support (O&S) cost per aircraft per year depends on several vari-

ables, including the mix of aircraft (wide-body vs. narrow-body), fuel costs (assumed at ap-

proximately $2.18/gal (FY06 $), and the reliability of the countermeasures. The average O&S

costs are summarized in Figure E-2.

For planning purposes, the DHS SPO evaluated the demographics of the US Carrier fleets using the Back Avia-

tion™ Schedule databases for 2004 and 2005 and identified the industry distinctions between narrow-body jets (sin-

gle aisle, Boeing 737 and larger), wide-body jets (double aisle), and small regional jets, finding this to be a very use-

ful construct.

Page 10

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DHS C

OUNTER

-MANPADS P

ROGRAM

HASE

II R

EPORT

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Figure E-2. Average O&S Costs per Aircraft per Year

The O&S cost/aircraft/year is derived from the projected total O&S cost for each representative

commercial aircraft profile. It represents a 'steady state' cost per mix of commercial aircraft for a

typical year. The O&S cost/flight is directly related to the O&S cost/aircraft/year, however it

is based on the average number of flights per year associated with the mix of commercial aircraft

(wide-body or narrow-body) included in a profile.

Deployment Risks

DHS S&T has accomplished the objectives it began two years ago for the adaptation of military

Counter-MANPADS equipment to a representative commercial aircraft. If Congress were to di-

rect DHS to equip a portion of the civil aircraft fleet today, the Phase II designs could be used to

protect selected aircraft under specified operational and regulatory conditions, but with signifi-

cant limits in affordability, technical performance, and maintenance that require tradeoffs.

Considerable risk impedes successful deployment within the commercial aviation industry. Some

of the remaining risks are technical, while some are policy and/or regulatory. These unknown

risks may translate to potentially cost liabilities unacceptable to industry. The validation and

verification of contractors’ operational and maintenance procedures in a commercial operating

environment are good examples of unknown risks. Until a significant number of Counter-

MANPADS units are installed and maintained by airlines, uncertainty regarding O&M costs will

remain. Successful countermeasures deployment can only occur if export controls, air carrier in-

surance considerations, future countermeasure certification, and international operations are ad-

dressed.

Page 11

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DHS C

OUNTER

-MANPADS P

ROGRAM

HASE

II R

EPORT

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Another significant factor in deciding to deploy Counter-MANPADS is the acquisition timeline

necessary to produce and install the equipment. Even with expedited acquisition procedures, it

would take 18-24 months to begin producing the countermeasures equipment, and to begin in-

stallation on a significant portion of the U.S. fleet.

Future Plans

To reduce residual deployment risks and total ownership costs, DHS is conducting a third phase

of the program to perform operational testing and evaluation, including extensive operation in

the commercial environment to validate performance, supportability, and commercial suitability.

A limited number of prototype Counter-MANPADS units will be flown on commercial cargo

aircraft in Phase III (not on passenger service aircraft). Operations, maintenance, and perform-

ance data will be assessed in the commercial air carrier environment. Advancements in reliabil-

ity, technology protection, cost of ownership, manufacturability, and performance will be as-

sessed and reported to Congress after the Phase III data are analyzed in 2008. During this time,

DHS will continue to evaluate alternative technologies to counter the threat of MANPADS and

assess their adaptation to commercial aviation.

In addition, DHS initiated an Aircraft Protection Program (APP) to reduce commercial aircraft

vulnerability and increase survivability. The DHS APP is evaluating other technology initiatives

in a collaborate effort with DoD, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and

other government agencies. The major current effort, Propulsion Control for Aircraft Recovery

(PCAR), is the joint program between DHS and NASA, with the objective of increasing com-

mercial aircraft survivability using thrust augmentation flight control technologies to allow safe

recovery of an aircraft that has suffered damage from terrorist attack. Future efforts may also in-

clude:

• Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Explosive (CBRE) Countermeasures;

• Aircraft Lighting and Lamp Studies;

• Emerging Counter-MANPADS Technology Assessment; and

• Pilot Training for Catastrophic Event Recovery.

DHS S&T is assessing additional MANPADS protection strategies and is integrating existing

economic, risk, and consequence analyses by balancing threats against risks associated with the

commercial aviation fleet. If Congress and the Administration make a decision to deploy

Counter-MANPADS in their current state of readiness, issues ranging from government property

and treaty policies (defensive weapons systems) to changes in threat technologies and fiscal

planning will have to be addressed with appropriate statutory and international responses by the

Federal Government. Substantial intervention will be required among domestic carriers, aircraft

manufacturers, and major airline maintenance facilities due to capacity limitations to equip air-

craft, which for the commercial fleet, could take over two decades without stimulating produc-

tion and building additional aircraft modification facilities.

Page 12

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DHS C

OUNTER

-MANPADS P

ROGRAM

HASE

II R

EPORT

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

1 Introduction

In January 2005, the DHS Counter-MANPADS program submitted a report to Congress, Pro-

tecting Commercial Aircraft from Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS), explaining

the then-status of the DHS program. This report updates the previous report by describing the

activities of the first two phases of the Counter-MANPADS program and presenting the results

to date.

In 2002, it was determined that MANPADS were a credible threat to commercial aviation. In

2003, Congress directed DHS to develop a plan for protecting commercial aircraft from the

threat—and then to implement it. DHS established a Counter-MANPADS SPO to execute the

plan, which laid out a two-year, two-phase program to evaluate and adapt military technology to

the Nation’s commercial air fleet. The SPO worked with DoD experts to develop a performance-

based competitive solicitation for industry to provide solutions within 24 months.

The strategy of the Counter-MANPADS program is to demonstrate proven military technology

in the commercial aviation environment through a rigorous systems engineering process and an

aggressive system development, demonstration, and evaluation program. The SPO works closely

with the system developers and other stakeholders to:

• Refine requirements, designs, and concepts of operations;

• Develop methods to mitigate technical and program risks; and

• Develop reliability/maintainability/supportability metrics; and to drive down total owner-

ship costs.

The SPO uses competitive and knowledge-based acquisition practices to assure the developed

solutions for implementation are the best available whenever possible.

In the fall of 2003, DHS received 24 white papers covering a wide array of countermeasure solu-

tions. DHS selected three industry teams with the most mature technologies to participate in the

first 6-month phase to produce preliminary designs, initial cost tradeoffs, technology transition

plans, and concepts of operation. BAE and NGC both offered solutions using DIRCM, a laser-

based technology. United Airlines (UAL) offered a flare-based solution. In August 2004, DHS

selected BAE and NGC to continue with the 18-month Phase II system development and demon-

stration program.

Shoulder-fired missiles, now in the hands of at least two dozen terrorist organizations, have been

used to attack 40 civilian aircraft, downing 25 and claiming over 600 lives.

Should a

MANPADS attack occur, the potential loss of life and the adverse economic impact on the do-

mestic and international aviation markets could be substantial. More than 29 million people are

Sources for this information include Homeland Security: Protecting Airliners from Terrorist Missiles, CRS

Report for Congress, updated February 15, 2005, pp. 3-6.

Page 13

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DHS C

OUNTER

-MANPADS P

ROGRAM

HASE

II R

EPORT

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

employed by more than 220 domestic and foreign air carriers, which contributes nearly $3 tril-

lion to the worldwide economy.

The United States and other concerned countries have recog-

nized the implications that the proliferation of such weapons represent to global economic and

political stability and have taken steps to counter the threat. The Counter-MANPADS program is

one of several U.S. initiatives designed to mitigate risks to civil aviation from MANPADS.

1.1 Background

Commercial aviation represents a major portion of the domestic and international economies, as

statistics compiled by U.S. Department of Transportation, Airline Transport Association, and

International Civil Aviation Organization show. The industry constitutes 8 percent of the global

economy, translating to nearly $3 trillion and 29 million jobs worldwide.

In 2001, it constituted

5.2 percent of the U.S. gross domestic product, translating to $513.5 billion. More than 220 do-

mestic and foreign airlines operate within the United States. As Figure 1 shows, air travel has

rebounded to pre-September 11th levels, with almost 650 million domestic and over 145 million

international passengers flying in 2005. On average, there are 20,000 flights with over 1.8 mil-

lion seats occupied on any given day in the United States.

1.1.1 Threat

MANPADS are a threat to the safety and

security of the airline industry.

MANPADS are short-range, shoulder-

fired anti-aircraft missiles carried and

fired either by one or several individuals.

They are easy to transport and conceal

since they average the size and weight of

a large duffle bag and easily fit in the

trunk of an automobile.

MANPADS were first produced in the

1960s. As of 2006, approximately 20

countries have produced or licensed the

production of 30 different types of

MANPADS. To date, estimates are that

one million missiles have been manufac-

tured; many of them have either been

destroyed or are under the control of na-

Global Press Briefing - Industry Remarks, Giovanni Bisignani, Director General and CEO, International Air

Transport Association, December 14, 2005.

Global Press Briefing - Industry Remarks, Giovanni Bisignani, Director General and CEO, International Air

Transport Association, December 14, 2005.

Federal Aviation Administration, FAA Aerospace Forecasts FY 2005-2016, available online at:

http://www.faa.gov/data_statistics/aviation/aerospace_forecasts/2005-2016/.

140.6

128.8

120.8

120.0

134.0

145.4

641.2

626.8

574.5

587.9

627.2

649.6

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

Domestic

International

Passenger Enplanements (Millions)

Figure 1. Air Travel is Rebounding from the Effects

of September 11

Page 14

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DHS C

OUNTER

-MANPADS P

ROGRAM

HASE

II R

EPORT

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

tion-states. However, intelligence estimates indicate that at least 24 terrorist organizations pos-

sess MANPADS.

Most of the MANPADS the terrorist organizations have use infrared seekers

(heat sensors), which guide the missile to the hot parts of a target; for an aircraft, this means the

engines (Figure 2). The most common MANPADS have a

range of up to three miles and can strike an aircraft up to

15,000 feet. Older MANPADS models can be bought for

less than $50,000.

Until recently, military aircraft were the primary targets of

MANPADS. On November 28, 2002, terrorists linked to

al-Qa’ida fired two MANPADS at an Israeli jetliner tak-

ing off from Mombasa, Kenya. Although the 2002 attack

was not successful, it focused the world’s attention on this

potential threat. On November 23, 2003, a DHL Interna-

tional cargo aircraft departing Baghdad Airport in Iraq

was struck by a surface-to-air missile, resulting in the complete loss of the left outboard engine

and part of the wing—and the eventual loss of the whole airframe upon landing. This last inci-

dent confirmed that such missiles were a clear and present threat to commercial aviation. In Au-

gust 2004, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) arrested two men in Albany, New York

while trying to buy shoulder-fired missiles. The threat remains real and an international concern.

Sources for this information include Homeland Security: Protecting Airliners from Terrorist Missiles, CRS

Report for Congress, updated February 15, 2005, pp. 3-6.

For a broad unclassified summary of the threat, see Homeland Security: Protecting Airliners from Terrorist

Missiles, CRS Report to Congress RL31741, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, February 15,

2005 (updated).

Figure 2. Typical Commercial

Aircraft Heat Sources

Page 15

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DHS C

OUNTER

-MANPADS P

ROGRAM

HASE

II R

EPORT

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

1.1.2 National Strategy

In 2002, a White House Task Force

representing 20 agencies developed a

multi-layered strategy to counter the

threat, specifically focusing on three

areas: (1) proliferation control and

threat reduction, (2) tactical counter-

measures, and (3) technical counter-

measures.

Figure 3 shows the three-pronged ap-

proach. The Department of State (DoS)

and the Transportation Security Ad-

ministration (TSA) took the lead in ar-

eas one and two, respectively. DHS

took the lead in the third area.

The program plan, submitted to Congress on May 22, 2003, proposed a two-year, two-phase

program “for research, development, testing, and evaluation of an antimissile device for com-

mercial aircraft.” The general consensus on the best approach was transitioning proven military

technologies to the commercial aviation environment.

In September 2003, the DHS Office of the Under Secretary for S&T created the SPO to manage

the Counter-MANPADS program.

1.2 The DHS Counter-MANPADS Program

The mission of the Counter-MANPADS program is to develop, demonstrate, and transition ad-

vanced technologies and Concepts of Operations (CONOPS) to protect commercial aircraft from

MANPADS. To accomplish this, the program focused on transferring current military missile

warning and countermeasure technology to the commercial aircraft fleet in the shortest time

frame possible, while taking commercial economic and logistic requirements into account.

During fall 2003, the Counter-MANPADS SPO released a performance-based solicitation and

conducted a competitive source selection process. Of the original 24 white papers received, DHS

invited five companies whose solutions appeared most viable to submit full proposals and oral

presentations. As a result of that source selection, BAE, NGC, and UAL were each invited to ne-

gotiate Other Transaction Authority (OTA) agreements for Phase I of the program.

Legislation introduced in the 108th Congress called for the installation of missile defense systems in all turbo-

jet aircraft used in scheduled air carrier service. Homeland Security appropriations designated $60 million in FY04,

$61 million in FY05, and $110 million in FY06 to fund a program to develop, test, deploy, and refine for commer-

cial aircraft a limited number of prototype missile countermeasure systems based on existing military technology.

Non-Proliferation

Department of State

Global weapons stockpile

Global export controls

Buy-back program

Tactical Operations

DHS TSA

Airport vulnerability

assessments & mitigation

Guidelines for identifying

and reporting threats

Elevated alert guidelines

Counter-MANPADS

Technical Countermeasures

DHS S&T

Re-engineer and demonstrate

technologies to counter threat

CIA - DIA - TSA - FBI

Intelligence

National Airspace System

FAA

Non-Proliferation

Department of State

Global weapons stockpile

Global export controls

Buy-back program

Tactical Operations

DHS TSA

Airport vulnerability

assessments & mitigation

Guidelines for identifying

and reporting threats

Elevated alert guidelines

Counter-MANPADS

Technical Countermeasures

DHS S&T

Re-engineer and demonstrate

technologies to counter threat

CIA - DIA - TSA - FBI

Intelligence

National Airspace System

FAA

Figure 3. Three-Pronged Approach to Countering the