TCUEC - Department of Homeland Security Counter-MANPADS Program Summary

This is the text only of the "suppressed" DHS Man Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) report scrubbed from the Federation of American Scientists website, retrieved from the Google cache on 15 August 2006. We've removed the Google header, changed the page title to better reflect the page contents, and added the ads immediately below. Get it here while you can...

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Department of

Homeland Security

Counter-MANPADS

Program Summary

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U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Science and Technology Directorate

July 2006

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ABLE OF

ONTENTS

Executive Summary........................................................................................................................ v

Overall Assessment.................................................................................................................... vi

Performance........................................................................................................................... vi

Suitability............................................................................................................................... vi

Cost .......................................................................................................................................vii

Deployment Risks...................................................................................................................... ix

Future Plans ................................................................................................................................ x

1 Introduction............................................................................................................................. 1

1.1 Background...................................................................................................................... 2

1.1.1 Threat.......................................................................................................................... 2

1.1.2 National Strategy ........................................................................................................ 4

1.2 The DHS Counter-MANPADS Program......................................................................... 4

1.2.1 Program Strategy ........................................................................................................ 5

1.2.2 Technical Considerations............................................................................................ 5

1.2.3 External Coordination................................................................................................. 6

1.2.4 Use of Other Transaction Authority ........................................................................... 7

1.3 Legacy IRCM Systems.................................................................................................... 8

1.4 Report Structure............................................................................................................... 8

2 System Requirements and Descriptions................................................................................ 10

2.1 Military Versus Commercial Environments.................................................................. 10

2.2 System Requirements..................................................................................................... 11

2.3 System Descriptions....................................................................................................... 13

2.3.1 BAE Systems: JETEYE™ System Overview ......................................................... 15

2.3.2 Northrop Grumman Corporation: The Guardian™ System .................................... 16

3 System Performance ............................................................................................................. 17

3.1 System Engineering Management ................................................................................. 17

3.2 System Engineering Process.......................................................................................... 18

3.2.1 System Requirements, Design Analysis, and Trade Studies .................................... 18

3.2.2 System Engineering Technical Control.................................................................... 18

3.3 System Verification: Design & Performance Evaluations............................................ 20

3.3.1 Modeling and Simulation.......................................................................................... 20

3.3.2 Developmental Verification Testing......................................................................... 21

3.3.3 Hardware-in-the-Loop Testing ................................................................................. 21

3.3.4 Flight Tests................................................................................................................ 22

3.3.5 Functional and Physical Configuration Audits......................................................... 23

3.4 System Assessment........................................................................................................ 24

4 Air Carrier Suitability ........................................................................................................... 25

4.1 Aircraft Compatibility.................................................................................................... 25

4.1.1 Fleet Assessment....................................................................................................... 25

4.1.2 Environmental Qualification Assessments............................................................... 26

4.1.3 FAA Certification ..................................................................................................... 27

4.2 Air Carrier Operations ................................................................................................... 30

4.2.1 Minimizing Impact to Airline Operations................................................................. 30

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4.2.2 Operational Logistics Support .................................................................................. 33

4.2.3 Maintenance Approach............................................................................................. 35

4.2.4 Reliability.................................................................................................................. 35

4.3 System Safety................................................................................................................. 37

4.4 System Security ............................................................................................................. 39

4.5 Emergency Ground Notification.................................................................................... 39

4.6 Assessment and Future Plans......................................................................................... 40

5 Cost Considerations .............................................................................................................. 42

5.1 Top-Level Cost Thresholds............................................................................................ 43

5.1.1 Total Acquisition Cost for Equipping 1000 Aircraft................................................ 44

5.1.2 Average O&S Cost for Operating 1,000 Aircraft..................................................... 44

5.2 Assumptions and Conditions ......................................................................................... 44

5.3 Acquisition Cost............................................................................................................. 46

5.3.1 Definition of Acquisition Cost.................................................................................. 46

5.3.2 Acquisition Cost Drivers........................................................................................... 46

5.3.3 Acquisition Cost Estimate (For Equipping 1,000 Aircraft)...................................... 48

5.3.4 Average Unit Production Cost.................................................................................. 50

5.3.5 Acquisition Cost Sensitivities................................................................................... 52

5.4 Operations and Support Costs (1,000 Aircraft) ............................................................. 53

5.4.1 Definition of Operations and Support....................................................................... 53

5.4.2 Operations and Support Cost Drivers....................................................................... 53

5.4.3 Operations and Support Cost Metrics....................................................................... 55

5.4.4 Operations and Support Costs Sensitivities.............................................................. 57

5.5 Potential Deployment Alternatives................................................................................ 57

5.5.1 Example Deployment Quantities.............................................................................. 57

5.5.2 Cost Metrics for Example Deployment Quantities................................................... 59

5.5.3 Budget Requirements................................................................................................ 60

5.6 Cost-related Conclusions & Recommendations ............................................................ 60

6 Deployment Risks & Concerns............................................................................................. 62

6.1 Technical Risks & Concerns.......................................................................................... 62

6.1.1 System Performance Tradeoffs................................................................................. 62

6.1.2 Spiral Upgrades......................................................................................................... 63

6.2 Policy Risks & Concerns............................................................................................... 64

6.2.1 Export Control .......................................................................................................... 64

6.2.2 Liability and Insurance Considerations .................................................................... 66

6.2.3 Role of DHS in Certifying Other Countermeasure Solutions................................... 67

6.2.4 Deployment Factors.................................................................................................. 68

6.2.5 International Considerations and Ramifications....................................................... 69

7 Summary............................................................................................................................... 70

7.1 Phase III Future Plans.................................................................................................... 70

7.1.1 System Performance ................................................................................................. 71

7.1.2 Air Carrier Suitability............................................................................................... 71

7.1.3 Cost........................................................................................................................... 71

7.1.4 Resolving Barriers & Constraints............................................................................. 71

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7.2 Aircraft Protection Program........................................................................................... 71

Acronyms...................................................................................................................................... 73

List of Figures

Figure 1. Air Travel is Rebounding from the Effects of September 11

.........................................2

Figure 2. Typical Commercial Aircraft Heat Sources....................................................................3

Figure 3. Three-Pronged Approach to Countering the MANPADS Threat ....................................4

Figure 4. External Coordination Key to Counter-MANPADS Program Success ...........................7

Figure 5. BAE JETEYE™ Distributed Design as Installed on an American Airlines B767 ........15

Figure 6. BAE JETEYE™ Distributed Design Components ........................................................15

Figure 7. NGC Guardian™ System Pod Installed on a FedEx MD-11.........................................16

Figure 8. NGC Guardian™ System Pod without Cover................................................................16

Figure 9. Classic System Engineering Process Focuses on Iterative Analyses & Trade

Studies................................................................................................................................18

Figure 10. System Engineering Process Flow & Verification Strategy.........................................20

Figure 11. HITL Test Matrix Missile Launch Locations...............................................................22

Figure 12. Counter-MANPADS Technology has Achieved TRL 7..............................................24

Figure 13. U.S. Commercial Fleet Distributions ...........................................................................30

Figure 13. Total Acquisition Cost Breakout for 1000 Aircraft......................................................49

Figure 14. Cost Per Installed Units................................................................................................52

Figure 15. Operations and Support Cost Breakout........................................................................54

List of Tables

Table 1. Comparison of Military Versus Commercial Environments...........................................11

Table 2. Summary of System Performance Parameters.................................................................12

Table 3. Summary of Operations and Supportability Performance Parameters............................13

Table 4. Summary of Cost Performance Parameters.....................................................................13

Table 5. Documentation Required by DHS from Contractors.......................................................17

Table 6. Environmental Qualification Testing Categories ............................................................26

Table 7. STC Process and Status Summary...................................................................................28

Table 8. Aircraft Maintenance and Service Plan...........................................................................32

Table 9. Operational Logistics Support Elements and Contractor Approaches ............................34

Table 10. Approaches to Maintenance Elements...........................................................................35

Table 11. Phase II System Safety Findings ...................................................................................39

Table 12. Top-Level Cost Thresholds ...........................................................................................43

Table 13. SPO Counter-MANPADS Baseline Acquisition Estimate............................................44

Table 14. SPO Counter-MANPADS Baseline O&S Estimate ......................................................44

Table 15. Phase II Summary of Cost Estimating Considerations..................................................45

Table 16. Counter-MANPADS System Acquisition Cost Estimates ............................................48

Table 17. Average Unit Production Cost.......................................................................................50

Table 18. Cost Improvement Curve Applied to Average Unit Production Cost...........................53

Table 19. Counter-MANPADS System Operations & Support Cost Estimates............................54

Table 20. Operations & Support Cost Metric (1,000 Passenger Aircraft).....................................56

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Table 21. Total O&S Cost Sensitivities (1,000 Passenger Aircraft)..............................................57

Table 22. Annual Order Profile for 100 Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) Aircraft.......................58

Table 23. Annual Order Profile for 600 Wide-body Passenger Aircraft.......................................59

Table 24. Annual Order Profile for 3,900 Passenger Aircraft (exclusive of Regional

Jets/Turbo-props) – Aggressive Schedule .........................................................................59

Table 25. Average Unit Cost [Constant GFY03$M].....................................................................60

Table 26. Flights per Year Breakdown..........................................................................................60

Table 27. Average O&S Cost Per Aircraft Per Year [Constant GFY03$] ....................................60

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Executive Summary

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate con-

ducted an aggressive 24-month prototype development program to demonstrate the technical fea-

sibility, assess total ownership costs, and evaluate the effectiveness of adapting military tech-

nologies to protect commercial aircraft against the threat of Man-Portable Air Defense Systems

(MANPADS). This report summarizes the results achieved over the past two years, including an

assessment of deployment considerations as well as the risks that remain before implementation

in a commercial aviation environment can be realized in a cost-effective and practical manner.

The strategy of the Counter-MANPADS program is to demonstrate proven military technology

in the commercial aviation environment through a rigorous systems engineering process and an

aggressive system development, demonstration, and evaluation program. In early 2004, DHS se-

lected three industry teams with the most mature technologies to participate in the first six-month

phase to produce preliminary designs, initial cost tradeoffs, technology transition plans, and con-

cepts of operation. BAE Systems (BAE) and Northrop Grumman Corporation (NGC) offered

electro-optical missile detection solutions using a laser-based technology known as Directed In-

frared Countermeasures (DIRCM). United Airlines offered a hybrid radar and electro-optical de-

tection solution with a flare-based countermeasure. The latter approach was not sufficiently ma-

ture to advance to Phase II because the integration of radar and electro-optical technologies had

not been accomplished; hence, the approach presented significant technical risks.

In August 2004, DHS selected BAE and NGC to continue with the 18-month Phase II system

development and demonstration program. The Counter-MANPADS System Program Office’s

(SPO) engineering team and the selected contractors used a rigorous systems engineering process

to transform commercial aviation operational needs into system performance, operations and

support, and cost requirements. The SPO pursued comprehensive assessments of the:

• Performance of military technology adapted for commercial aircraft by designing, de-

veloping, fabricating, testing, and evaluating systems for commercial operations.

• Suitability of the technology in terms of:

Operations and maintenance in the commercial aviation environment;

Operations within the National Airspace System (NAS);

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airworthiness certification; and

Critical military technology protection.

• Cost of developing, installing, and supporting a Counter-MANPADS solution in the

commercial aviation environment.

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Overall Assessment

Performance

DHS and Phase II contractors BAE and NGC demonstrated adaptations of the military’s DIRCM

technology on commercial aircraft during this program. Emerging results from analysis of the

available data indicate that the prototype units are capable of partially meeting the DHS perform-

ance requirements. Some limitations are noted in adapting the technology for commercial use.

However, all testing is not yet complete, and further analysis of integration complexities is still

required prior to a definitive final assessment.

Initial performance assessments indicate that a Counter-MANPADS system in either a distrib-

uted or pod configuration can protect commercial aircraft selected and tested during Phase II.

Additional design, development, test, and actual operation in the commercial environment is

needed to improve reliability, reduce drag and weight, incorporate technology protection, en-

hance producibility, and incorporate additional event notification capabilities. If narrow-body

and regional jets are to be equipped to protect against Counter-MANPADS, further design re-

finements, integration, and tests must be undertaken.

Suitability

It is feasible to transition selected military technology to the commercial aviation environment,

but it is challenging from logistics, cost, export control, and, to some extent, from a liability per-

spective. DHS and Phase II contractors conducted limited ground and flight testing within the

commercial airline environment. Although no significant physical aircraft compatibility issues

for proposed prototypes presented barriers to deployment to date, a number of policy, technology

protection, and international access issues have been identified.

Both contractors, with help from their airline partners, documented conceptual processes for

supporting different aircraft operators in the commercial aviation environment. Depot and inven-

tory management facilities may need to be expanded to accommodate increased workload for

Counter-MANPADS component repairs and to support related aspects of their domestic and in-

ternational operations.

Two different configurations, a Boeing 767 and a McDonnell Douglas MD-11, are on track for

Supplemental Type Certificates (STC) to be issued during 2006. An STC for a Counter-

MANPADS installation on a Boeing 747 is anticipated by the end of summer 2006. These STCs

are necessary for Phase III operational evaluations; they will be based on the FAA’s airworthi-

ness evaluation and a provisional certification approval for operational evaluation by DHS. In

addition they will have limitations regarding their operational use. It should be noted that these

three aircraft types represent only five percent of the domestic-US commercial fleet. If produc-

tion deployment is considered, separate certifications will be required for other aircraft types

(e.g., Boeing 777, Airbus 380) and series (e.g., Boeing 737-500, Boeing 737-700), and the STCs

will require DHS approvals of the equipment’s functionality and effectiveness. The two contrac-

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tor teams have conducted extensive fleet surveys to identify potential FAA certification issues

and costs associated with fleet-wide application.

The Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies (SAFETY) Act of 2002 and

the Terrorism Risk Insurance Revision Act of 2005 help, but do not address all liability issues

relating to deployment of these Counter-MANPADS systems, regardless of ownership, causing

concern for the airlines and/or their contract maintenance partners.

DHS has been working closely with the Department of State (DoS) and the Department of De-

fense (DoD) to protect critical military technology used for Counter-MANPADS equipment on

commercial aircraft. The contractors have each produced security management plans that iden-

tify the technologies requiring protection, the logistics associated with protective measures, and

recommendations for technical approaches to mitigate vulnerabilities and reduce the cost of

compliance with the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and its associated International Traffic in

Arms Regulations (ITAR). Protecting the underlying military technology in a commercial envi-

ronment is challenging and will need to be addressed in a global manner if Counter-MANPADS

units are deployed in a commercial environment.

Commercial air carriers must be able to integrate Counter-MANPADS equipment into their op-

erations. Each contractor developed Operations and Maintenance (O&M) procedures to mini-

mize the operating cost burden, taking into consideration these O&M procedures need to remain

consistent with current commercial aviation practices. There are substantial affordability impli-

cations raised by the proposed prototype units. The risk remains moderate to high that the com-

mercial airlines’ economic business model, which emphasizes high reliability and low cost,

would be adversely impacted by the current prototypes. Reduction of these risks will be pursued

in Phase III.

Cost

Development, acquisition, operations, and maintenance costs depend on acquisition strategies

and deployment policies. During Phase II, various acquisition and deployment scenarios were

explored. DHS estimates that at least one of the two current contractors is capable of achieving a

cost goal of $1 million for the 1,000

installed unit. However, competition will play an

important role in achieving targeted prices, and the contractors must still achieve targeted

efficiencies. DHS further projects that the original operations and support cost threshold of $300

per flight can no longer be met for installed Counter-MANPADS equipment. This is due to re-

cent increases in fuel costs, which have more than doubled since Phase I, increasing the contribu-

tion of fuel to O&S costs from 35 percent to about 50 percent. With inflation and increased fuel

costs, the projected cost per flight for a fleet of 1,000 aircraft averages $365 per flight.

The dollar amounts used in this section are FY03 dollars and have not been adjusted for inflation. For the sake of

consistency throughout Phases I and II of the Program, it was agreed to continue to use FY03 dollars.

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Compliance with AECA and ITAR, in their current form, is a potential cost driver and may serve

as a potential barrier to deployment of this technology to the commercial aviation industry for

OCONUS flights.

As more Counter-MANPADS equipment is ordered and installed, the average cost per unit de-

creases due to efficiency gains in the production process. Figure E-1 shows the costs for procur-

ing and installing the equipment (A-kits and B-kits) only; it does not include costs of STCs re-

quired by the FAA, initial spares, or facility costs. A-kits are the permanent installation hard-

ware on the aircraft (wiring, cables, etc.) and B-kits are made up of the countermeasures hard-

ware and software (sensors, support electronics, etc.).

NOTE: The Widebody Sample includes a mix of passenger and cargo aircraft. “Baseline” refers to a mix of wide- and nar-

row-body aircraft. “All Passenger” does not include regional jets.

Figure E-1. Average Procurement Costs

The average Operations and Support (O&S) cost per aircraft per year depends on several vari-

ables, including the mix of aircraft (wide-body vs. narrow-body), fuel costs (assumed at ap-

proximately $2.18/gal (FY06 $), and the reliability of the countermeasures. The average O&S

costs are summarized in Figure E-2.

For planning purposes, the DHS SPO evaluated the demographics of the US Carrier fleets using the Back Avia-

tion™ Schedule databases for 2004 and 2005 and identified the industry distinctions between narrow-body jets (sin-

gle aisle, Boeing 737 and larger), wide-body jets (double aisle), and small regional jets, finding this to be a very use-

ful construct.

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Figure E-2. Average O&S Costs per Aircraft per Year

The O&S cost/aircraft/year is derived from the projected total O&S cost for each representative

commercial aircraft profile. It represents a 'steady state' cost per mix of commercial aircraft for a

typical year. The O&S cost/flight is directly related to the O&S cost/aircraft/year, however it

is based on the average number of flights per year associated with the mix of commercial aircraft

(wide-body or narrow-body) included in a profile.

Deployment Risks

DHS S&T has accomplished the objectives it began two years ago for the adaptation of military

Counter-MANPADS equipment to a representative commercial aircraft. If Congress were to di-

rect DHS to equip a portion of the civil aircraft fleet today, the Phase II designs could be used to

protect selected aircraft under specified operational and regulatory conditions, but with signifi-

cant limits in affordability, technical performance, and maintenance that require tradeoffs.

Considerable risk impedes successful deployment within the commercial aviation industry. Some

of the remaining risks are technical, while some are policy and/or regulatory. These unknown

risks may translate to potentially cost liabilities unacceptable to industry. The validation and

verification of contractors’ operational and maintenance procedures in a commercial operating

environment are good examples of unknown risks. Until a significant number of Counter-

MANPADS units are installed and maintained by airlines, uncertainty regarding O&M costs will

remain. Successful countermeasures deployment can only occur if export controls, air carrier in-

surance considerations, future countermeasure certification, and international operations are ad-

dressed.

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Another significant factor in deciding to deploy Counter-MANPADS is the acquisition timeline

necessary to produce and install the equipment. Even with expedited acquisition procedures, it

would take 18-24 months to begin producing the countermeasures equipment, and to begin in-

stallation on a significant portion of the U.S. fleet.

Future Plans

To reduce residual deployment risks and total ownership costs, DHS is conducting a third phase

of the program to perform operational testing and evaluation, including extensive operation in

the commercial environment to validate performance, supportability, and commercial suitability.

A limited number of prototype Counter-MANPADS units will be flown on commercial cargo

aircraft in Phase III (not on passenger service aircraft). Operations, maintenance, and perform-

ance data will be assessed in the commercial air carrier environment. Advancements in reliabil-

ity, technology protection, cost of ownership, manufacturability, and performance will be as-

sessed and reported to Congress after the Phase III data are analyzed in 2008. During this time,

DHS will continue to evaluate alternative technologies to counter the threat of MANPADS and

assess their adaptation to commercial aviation.

In addition, DHS initiated an Aircraft Protection Program (APP) to reduce commercial aircraft

vulnerability and increase survivability. The DHS APP is evaluating other technology initiatives

in a collaborate effort with DoD, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and

other government agencies. The major current effort, Propulsion Control for Aircraft Recovery

(PCAR), is the joint program between DHS and NASA, with the objective of increasing com-

mercial aircraft survivability using thrust augmentation flight control technologies to allow safe

recovery of an aircraft that has suffered damage from terrorist attack. Future efforts may also in-

clude:

• Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Explosive (CBRE) Countermeasures;

• Aircraft Lighting and Lamp Studies;

• Emerging Counter-MANPADS Technology Assessment; and

• Pilot Training for Catastrophic Event Recovery.

DHS S&T is assessing additional MANPADS protection strategies and is integrating existing

economic, risk, and consequence analyses by balancing threats against risks associated with the

commercial aviation fleet. If Congress and the Administration make a decision to deploy

Counter-MANPADS in their current state of readiness, issues ranging from government property

and treaty policies (defensive weapons systems) to changes in threat technologies and fiscal

planning will have to be addressed with appropriate statutory and international responses by the

Federal Government. Substantial intervention will be required among domestic carriers, aircraft

manufacturers, and major airline maintenance facilities due to capacity limitations to equip air-

craft, which for the commercial fleet, could take over two decades without stimulating produc-

tion and building additional aircraft modification facilities.

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1 Introduction

In January 2005, the DHS Counter-MANPADS program submitted a report to Congress, Pro-

tecting Commercial Aircraft from Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS), explaining

the then-status of the DHS program. This report updates the previous report by describing the

activities of the first two phases of the Counter-MANPADS program and presenting the results

to date.

In 2002, it was determined that MANPADS were a credible threat to commercial aviation. In

2003, Congress directed DHS to develop a plan for protecting commercial aircraft from the

threat—and then to implement it. DHS established a Counter-MANPADS SPO to execute the

plan, which laid out a two-year, two-phase program to evaluate and adapt military technology to

the Nation’s commercial air fleet. The SPO worked with DoD experts to develop a performance-

based competitive solicitation for industry to provide solutions within 24 months.

The strategy of the Counter-MANPADS program is to demonstrate proven military technology

in the commercial aviation environment through a rigorous systems engineering process and an

aggressive system development, demonstration, and evaluation program. The SPO works closely

with the system developers and other stakeholders to:

• Refine requirements, designs, and concepts of operations;

• Develop methods to mitigate technical and program risks; and

• Develop reliability/maintainability/supportability metrics; and to drive down total owner-

ship costs.

The SPO uses competitive and knowledge-based acquisition practices to assure the developed

solutions for implementation are the best available whenever possible.

In the fall of 2003, DHS received 24 white papers covering a wide array of countermeasure solu-

tions. DHS selected three industry teams with the most mature technologies to participate in the

first 6-month phase to produce preliminary designs, initial cost tradeoffs, technology transition

plans, and concepts of operation. BAE and NGC both offered solutions using DIRCM, a laser-

based technology. United Airlines (UAL) offered a flare-based solution. In August 2004, DHS

selected BAE and NGC to continue with the 18-month Phase II system development and demon-

stration program.

Shoulder-fired missiles, now in the hands of at least two dozen terrorist organizations, have been

used to attack 40 civilian aircraft, downing 25 and claiming over 600 lives.

Should a

MANPADS attack occur, the potential loss of life and the adverse economic impact on the do-

mestic and international aviation markets could be substantial. More than 29 million people are

Sources for this information include Homeland Security: Protecting Airliners from Terrorist Missiles, CRS

Report for Congress, updated February 15, 2005, pp. 3-6.

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employed by more than 220 domestic and foreign air carriers, which contributes nearly $3 tril-

lion to the worldwide economy.

The United States and other concerned countries have recog-

nized the implications that the proliferation of such weapons represent to global economic and

political stability and have taken steps to counter the threat. The Counter-MANPADS program is

one of several U.S. initiatives designed to mitigate risks to civil aviation from MANPADS.

1.1 Background

Commercial aviation represents a major portion of the domestic and international economies, as

statistics compiled by U.S. Department of Transportation, Airline Transport Association, and

International Civil Aviation Organization show. The industry constitutes 8 percent of the global

economy, translating to nearly $3 trillion and 29 million jobs worldwide.

In 2001, it constituted

5.2 percent of the U.S. gross domestic product, translating to $513.5 billion. More than 220 do-

mestic and foreign airlines operate within the United States. As Figure 1 shows, air travel has

rebounded to pre-September 11th levels, with almost 650 million domestic and over 145 million

international passengers flying in 2005. On average, there are 20,000 flights with over 1.8 mil-

lion seats occupied on any given day in the United States.

1.1.1 Threat

MANPADS are a threat to the safety and

security of the airline industry.

MANPADS are short-range, shoulder-

fired anti-aircraft missiles carried and

fired either by one or several individuals.

They are easy to transport and conceal

since they average the size and weight of

a large duffle bag and easily fit in the

trunk of an automobile.

MANPADS were first produced in the

1960s. As of 2006, approximately 20

countries have produced or licensed the

production of 30 different types of

MANPADS. To date, estimates are that

one million missiles have been manufac-

tured; many of them have either been

destroyed or are under the control of na-

Global Press Briefing - Industry Remarks, Giovanni Bisignani, Director General and CEO, International Air

Transport Association, December 14, 2005.

Global Press Briefing - Industry Remarks, Giovanni Bisignani, Director General and CEO, International Air

Transport Association, December 14, 2005.

Federal Aviation Administration, FAA Aerospace Forecasts FY 2005-2016, available online at:

http://www.faa.gov/data_statistics/aviation/aerospace_forecasts/2005-2016/.

140.6

128.8

120.8

120.0

134.0

145.4

641.2

626.8

574.5

587.9

627.2

649.6

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

Domestic

International

Passenger Enplanements (Millions)

Figure 1. Air Travel is Rebounding from the Effects

of September 11

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tion-states. However, intelligence estimates indicate that at least 24 terrorist organizations pos-

sess MANPADS.

Most of the MANPADS the terrorist organizations have use infrared seekers

(heat sensors), which guide the missile to the hot parts of a target; for an aircraft, this means the

engines (Figure 2). The most common MANPADS have a

range of up to three miles and can strike an aircraft up to

15,000 feet. Older MANPADS models can be bought for

less than $50,000.

Until recently, military aircraft were the primary targets of

MANPADS. On November 28, 2002, terrorists linked to

al-Qa’ida fired two MANPADS at an Israeli jetliner tak-

ing off from Mombasa, Kenya. Although the 2002 attack

was not successful, it focused the world’s attention on this

potential threat. On November 23, 2003, a DHL Interna-

tional cargo aircraft departing Baghdad Airport in Iraq

was struck by a surface-to-air missile, resulting in the complete loss of the left outboard engine

and part of the wing—and the eventual loss of the whole airframe upon landing. This last inci-

dent confirmed that such missiles were a clear and present threat to commercial aviation. In Au-

gust 2004, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) arrested two men in Albany, New York

while trying to buy shoulder-fired missiles. The threat remains real and an international concern.

Sources for this information include Homeland Security: Protecting Airliners from Terrorist Missiles, CRS

Report for Congress, updated February 15, 2005, pp. 3-6.

For a broad unclassified summary of the threat, see Homeland Security: Protecting Airliners from Terrorist

Missiles, CRS Report to Congress RL31741, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, February 15,

2005 (updated).

Figure 2. Typical Commercial

Aircraft Heat Sources

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1.1.2 National Strategy

In 2002, a White House Task Force

representing 20 agencies developed a

multi-layered strategy to counter the

threat, specifically focusing on three

areas: (1) proliferation control and

threat reduction, (2) tactical counter-

measures, and (3) technical counter-

measures.

Figure 3 shows the three-pronged ap-

proach. The Department of State (DoS)

and the Transportation Security Ad-

ministration (TSA) took the lead in ar-

eas one and two, respectively. DHS

took the lead in the third area.

The program plan, submitted to Congress on May 22, 2003, proposed a two-year, two-phase

program “for research, development, testing, and evaluation of an antimissile device for com-

mercial aircraft.” The general consensus on the best approach was transitioning proven military

technologies to the commercial aviation environment.

In September 2003, the DHS Office of the Under Secretary for S&T created the SPO to manage

the Counter-MANPADS program.

1.2 The DHS Counter-MANPADS Program

The mission of the Counter-MANPADS program is to develop, demonstrate, and transition ad-

vanced technologies and Concepts of Operations (CONOPS) to protect commercial aircraft from

MANPADS. To accomplish this, the program focused on transferring current military missile

warning and countermeasure technology to the commercial aircraft fleet in the shortest time

frame possible, while taking commercial economic and logistic requirements into account.

During fall 2003, the Counter-MANPADS SPO released a performance-based solicitation and

conducted a competitive source selection process. Of the original 24 white papers received, DHS

invited five companies whose solutions appeared most viable to submit full proposals and oral

presentations. As a result of that source selection, BAE, NGC, and UAL were each invited to ne-

gotiate Other Transaction Authority (OTA) agreements for Phase I of the program.

Legislation introduced in the 108th Congress called for the installation of missile defense systems in all turbo-

jet aircraft used in scheduled air carrier service. Homeland Security appropriations designated $60 million in FY04,

$61 million in FY05, and $110 million in FY06 to fund a program to develop, test, deploy, and refine for commer-

cial aircraft a limited number of prototype missile countermeasure systems based on existing military technology.

Non-Proliferation

Department of State

Global weapons stockpile

Global export controls

Buy-back program

Tactical Operations

DHS TSA

Airport vulnerability

assessments & mitigation

Guidelines for identifying

and reporting threats

Elevated alert guidelines

Counter-MANPADS

Technical Countermeasures

DHS S&T

Re-engineer and demonstrate

technologies to counter threat

CIA - DIA - TSA - FBI

Intelligence

National Airspace System

FAA

Non-Proliferation

Department of State

Global weapons stockpile

Global export controls

Buy-back program

Tactical Operations

DHS TSA

Airport vulnerability

assessments & mitigation

Guidelines for identifying

and reporting threats

Elevated alert guidelines

Counter-MANPADS

Technical Countermeasures

DHS S&T

Re-engineer and demonstrate

technologies to counter threat

CIA - DIA - TSA - FBI

Intelligence

National Airspace System

FAA

Figure 3. Three-Pronged Approach to Countering the

MANPADS Threat

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During the 6-month Phase I, each contractor developed and finalized system designs meeting the

solicitation requirements and conducted trade studies regarding cost, maintenance, training, reli-

ability, airframe and avionics integration analysis, and FAA certification issues. At the end of

Phase I, DHS considered the respective maturity of the technologies and their potential applica-

tion to the commercial aviation environment to select the two teams employing DIRCM tech-

nologies to proceed to Phase II of the DHS program. BAE’s system is a variant of the U.S. Army

Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasures (ATIRCM) system. NGC’s system is a variant of the

U.S. Air Force Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures (LAIRCM) system.

Phase II began in August 2004 and continued through January 2006. During this 18-month

phase, BAE and NGC (hereafter referred to as “the contractors”) integrated their solutions onto

airframes, conducted ground and flight tests, and applied for Supplemental Type Certificates

(STC) from the FAA. DHS conducted independent analyses of the cost and maintenance data

provided by the contractors and conducted independent testing to verify the results satisfied the

system performance requirements as defined in the Counter-MANPADS program solicitation.

1.2.1 Program Strategy

The Counter-MANPADS SPO has conducted an aggressive system development, demonstration,

and evaluation program to take proven technology and adapt it for deployment in the commercial

aviation environment. The SPO worked closely throughout Phases I and II with the system de-

velopers and other stakeholders to refine requirements, refine designs, refine concepts of opera-

tions, develop methods to mitigate technical and program risks, develop reliabil-

ity/maintainability/supportability metrics, and drive down total ownership costs. During Phase II

the SPO also worked with the developers to demonstrate the efficacy of the redesigned Counter-

MANPADS system by installing and testing it on commercial airlines.

DIRCM was identified as the most viable approach to countering the threat of MANPADS to

commercial aircraft. The DHS source selection process encouraged and considered all ap-

proaches that were “likely to meet performance, operational, and cost constraints,” including

DIRCM. The UAL approach developed throughout Phase I was a flare-based system; however,

DHS determined that the UAL system was not sufficiently mature to continue into Phase II.

Throughout the first two years of the program, DHS continued to evaluate other technologies and

approaches for countering the threat of MANPADS. None of them, including other aircraft-based

systems and ground-based systems, appeared to be sufficiently mature for further study by DHS.

1.2.2 Technical Considerations

The military and commercial aircraft environments are radically different, and a number of is-

sues must be considered in migrating technology from the military aircraft environment to the

commercial sector.

Because the program was based on existing, proven technologies, these

other issues were critical to the determination as to whether migration would be viable. Phase I

See System Requirements and Descriptions for more information on the differences between the military and

commercial environments.

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was dedicated to understanding these issues and the differences between the two operational en-

vironments. Phase II refined the understanding of these issues and validated them with commer-

cial aviation stakeholders. During Phase III, the contractors and the SPO will collect information

to further refine and validate them.

• Aircraft Integration – Military countermeasure systems are typically designed to be in-

tegrated with specific aircraft; a major component of the Counter-MANPADS program

has been to develop a single countermeasure that can be physically integrated with a large

number of airframes. For more details on this subject, see Section 4.1, Aircraft Compati-

bility.

• Maintenance and Logistics Support – Any system integrated onto aircraft must be

maintainable and supportable within the existing commercial aviation environment. The

time and resources required to maintain the system on the flight line can impact the way

in which the airlines conduct business. The Counter-MANPADS systems must be de-

signed to minimize such impacts. For more details on this subject, see Section 4.2, Air

Carrier Operations.

• System Security – Aircraft equipped with the current countermeasure technology are

physically defended; access to the equipment is strictly limited/controlled. The commer-

cial countermeasure systems must be designed to protect the sensitive embedded tech-

nologies. For more details on this subject, see Section 4.4, System Security.

• Emergency Ground Notification – To assist in determining the appropriate action to be

taken in case of an attack, designated officials on the ground must be notified as quickly

as possible. To minimize the effects of false notifications, the system must be accurate

enough to minimize the number of false alarms. Further, the system must have a manual

override allowing the pilots to turn off the capability. For more details on this subject, see

Section 4.5, Emergency Ground Notification.

• Life Cycle Cost – The cost of installing Counter-MANPADS systems includes not only

the cost of the system itself, but also costs to develop manufacturing capabilities, the lost

revenue to airlines due to downtime of the system during initial installation and extra

time during major maintenance cycles, additional maintenance and support costs, and any

costs at the end of each system’s life (i.e., removal and destruction). Any system must be

designed to minimize costs as much as practicable. For more details on this subject, see

Section 5, Cost Considerations.

1.2.3 External Coordination

Interagency cooperation has been, and will remain, essential to the success of the Counter-

MANPADS program. DHS has relied on the expertise of appropriate government agencies to

ensure that proposed systems can operate within the existing framework of the NAS. The FAA

has been a key player in ensuring that airworthiness requirements are met. DoD lent its expertise

in evaluating the technical solutions, including testing the systems. TSA was instrumental in

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helping ensure the system works within the framework of overall airport security, while the FBI

has been involved in the Emergency Ground Notification (EGN) effort from a law enforcement

response aspect. The DoD, DoS, and the Department of Commerce (DoC) have worked with the

SPO to determine the scope of the export control issues involved in using military technologies

and to explore potential resolutions to those issues.

Interagency and stakeholder working relationships are depicted in Figure 4.

DHS

Counter-MANPADS

SPO

DHS

Counter-MANPADS

SPO

System Design and

Development Contractors

DoD

Department

of Defense

DoC

Department

of Commerce

DoS

Department of State

FAMS

Federal

Air Marshal

Service

FAA

Federal

Aviation

Administration

TSA

Transportation

Security

Administration

ICICIC

Intelligence

Community

CIA DIA

FBI TSA

Commercial Aviation

Community

Operational Insight

Aircraft Protection

Figure 4. External Coordination Key to Counter-MANPADS Program Success

In addition to other government agencies, the SPO has been in regular contact with the commer-

cial aviation community, including the aircraft manufacturers, airlines, and pilot organizations, to

achieve their buy-in wherever possible. Annual stakeholder meetings have allowed stakeholder

involvement and have included participation by over 50 different organizations.

1.2.4 Use of Other Transaction Authority

Congress authorized DHS to use OTAs for contracting.

This authority provides the flexibility

to selectively depart from procurement contracts rules imposed by statute or regulation, making

Under Section 831(a)(2) of Public Law (P.L.) 107-296.

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them useful in acquiring cutting-edge technologies from entities that traditionally have declined

to do business with the government.

While BAE and NGC are established government contractors, they collaborated with non-

traditional companies, including American Airlines, Delta Airlines, Federal Express (FedEx),

and Northwest Airlines, to engage commercial aviation interests. The flexibility afforded by

OTA authority has provided DHS and the contractors with more options in negotiating require-

ments, payment schedules, and other crucial elements of contracting such as intellectual property

rights. The OTA approach enabled DHS to maintain the program schedule while encouraging

proactive participation, frank communications, and mutual understanding between the SPO and

the contractors.

1.3 Legacy IRCM Systems

Infrared countermeasures (IRCM) systems have been used by the military for decades. Two pri-

mary countermeasures have been developed and deployed: expendables and laser jammers. The

expendables are typically pyrotechnic flares, ejected in multiple units in response to detection by

a missile warning receiver of a missile in flight. Designed to draw infrared seekers away from an

aircraft, the flares present their confusing heat sources to the inbound missile. Laser jammers,

often referred to as DIRCMs, on the other hand, direct a beam of laser energy at the inbound

missile, confusing the guidance system so that the seeker steers the missile away from the air-

craft.

Although DIRCM systems have been installed on head-of-state and commercial-derivative mili-

tary aircraft, these one-of-a-kind installations have been expensive and required either military or

customized support infrastructure. Airworthiness certification for Counter-MANPADS on com-

mercial aircraft requires a more rigorous regulatory conformance process than that which has

applied to military DIRCM systems.

1.4 Report Structure

The remainder of this report is structured as follows:

Section 2, System Requirements and Descriptions, summarizes the performance-based require-

ments the contractors used in designing their systems.

Section 3, System Performance, discusses the system engineering approach followed by the

SPO, including performance assessment. This section includes an overview of performance veri-

fication and evaluation of the two prototype systems, followed by a summary of the results

achieved.

Section 4, Air Carrier Suitability, reports on the extent to which the evaluated systems are suit-

able for the commercial air carrier environment, including air carrier operations, system safety,

system security, and emergency ground notification. This chapter includes discussion on systems

FAA Federal Aviation Regulations, 14 CFR, Parts 25 and 121.

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applicability on wide- and narrow-body aircraft, environmental qualification assessments, and

certification by the FAA for airworthiness and safety.

Section 5, Cost Considerations, discusses the costs of implementing a program to deploy coun-

termeasures systems in the commercial aviation environment. Total life cycle costs are illustrated

through the use of two representative implementation scenarios. Challenges relating to the transi-

tion of military technology, industrial base availability and utilization, and cost modeling are dis-

cussed. The overall approach, sources of data, and the assumptions and cost drivers are reviewed.

Details on the implementation scenarios, acquisition cost sensitivities, operations and support

costs, implementation funding, budget requirements, funding resources, and alternative imple-

mentations are also covered.

Section 6, Deployment Risks & Concerns, explores several barriers or constraints to deploying

countermeasures systems to protect commercial aircraft. Discussions cover export control, insur-

ance considerations, the role of DHS in certifying other countermeasure solutions, and interna-

tional considerations and ramifications of deployment.

Section 7, Summary, summarizes the Phase II testing and evaluation assessments for the proto-

types in system performance, suitability, and cost, followed by a short discussion of Phase III

objectives and future plans.

An acronyms list is also provided to assist the reader in understanding terms and abbreviations.

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2 System Requirements and Descriptions

This chapter shows the difference between the military and commercial airline environment,

summarizes the performance-based system requirements of the DHS Counter-MANPADS pro-

gram, and describes the systems proposed by the contractors to meet the requirements.

In serving the flying public, commercial aviation has long been a large, competitive, and profit-

driven segment of the U.S. economy, focused on maximum utilization of resources. Military

aviation focuses on prosecuting military missions while protecting aircrews and troops, aiming to

achieve high levels of utility and protection for the longest possible product life cycle. Cost is a

factor, but different tradeoff analyses are made when compared to the commercial sector.

2.1 Military Versus Commercial Environments

There are critical differences between military and commercial operating environments and the

requirements that the contractors analyzed to optimize their designs for the commercial aviation

environment.

Table 1 shows some of the major areas where differences affect the engineering of a Counter-

MANPADS system.

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Table 1. Comparison of Military Versus Commercial Environments

Requirements

Military

Commercial

Threat

Multiple threats: MANPADS (Surface-

to-air) and Infrared Air-to-air

Multiple threats: MANPADS only

Countermeasure

Effectiveness

• High probability, low-to-medium con-

sequence event

• Highly effective countermeasures

required; multiple countermeasures

may be used on each aircraft

• Systems engineering trades opti-

mized on performance

• Aircraft infrared signature typically

low-to-medium intensity

• Aircraft maneuver possible

• Low probability, high consequence

event

• Highly effective countermeasures

required; performance must be

achieved with a single system

• Performance trades meet cost

targets

• Aircraft infrared signature typically

medium-to-high intensity

• Aircraft maneuver not possible

Cost

• Acceptance of high initial cost to

achieve performance and state-of-

the-art technology

• Airlines operate on thin margins

Operations

Tempo

• Hundreds of flight hours per year

• Thousands of flight hours per year

Reliability

• Typical Mean Flight Hours Between-

Failure (MFHBF) numbers are in the

range of 200 to 400 hours

• Supplemented by a robust support

infrastructure backed with personnel

and many spare parts

• Less competition

• Typical MFHBF numbers for elec-

tronic systems are in the range of

10,000 hours

• Lean just-in-time logistics

• Commercial competition drives up

MFHBF

Operational

Environment

• Harsh, war-zone environment

• Harsh, sand, dust, storm, tempera-

ture, altitude environments

• Excessive cycling at extreme limits

• Relatively benign environment

• High altitude flight for long periods

with system turned off

Support

Infrastructure

• Restricted access military bases with

full and necessary resources to sup-

port product as designed

• U.S. citizens with classified data ac-

cess clearances

• Minimal support infrastructure

needed at the lowest cost

• Less restrictive and supported by

non-U.S. citizens

2.2 System Requirements

Tables 2, 3, and 4 summarize the performance-based requirements established at the outset of the

system development and demonstration program. These requirements were developed by work-

ing closely with DoD, the Administration, and the commercial aviation community. These re-

quirements reflect a balance of performance and cost metrics.

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Table 2. Summary of System Performance Parameters

System Performance

Parameters

Requirements

Threat

Protect commercial airliners during flight against first- through third-

generation MANPADS; specific list is contained in the Classified Annex of

this document

Probability of Success

Successfully counter single and simultaneous (time of impact) engage-

ments; please see the Classified Annex for detailed requirements

False

Notification

False notifications of less than one in 1,000,000 flights, with an objective

of zero; false notifications should not impede countering simultaneous

threat missile launches

Coverage

Capable of effective operation against a MANPADS attack within the

threat envelope with 360-degree coverage in azimuth and elevation angles

commensurate with typical commercial flight profiles and MANPADS pro-

files.

Aircraft

Capable of being installed on commercial aircraft the size of a Boeing 737

or larger (additional aircraft may be added)

Weight

Installed weight of 800 pounds or less, preferably less than 500 pounds

Prime Power

Draw normal aircraft power from existing aircraft power sources

Drag

Aerodynamic drag on the aircraft of one percent or less

Common

Aircraft

Interface

Common means of attaching the system to various aircraft is desired, with

installation and checkout capable of being accomplished by third parties

Protection of Sensitive

Technology

Prevent or delay exploitation of critical technology; provide a security

management plan demonstrating comprehensive protection of system in-

tegrity, performance, and critical technologies, including anti-tamper de-

signs

Emergency Ground

Notification

Transmit notification of a detected missile launch event to Air Traffic Con-

trol (ATC) through the aircraft transponder

Flight Deck Interface

Provide electrical power control, status, and event notification

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Table 3. Summary of Operations and Supportability Performance Parameters

Operations and

Supportability

Parameters

Requirements

Availability

Cannot delay takeoff or landing

Reliability

Reliable for more than 3,000 flight hours, preferably 4,500 flight hours

Maintainability

Maintainable within the current commercial aircraft operating environment

Interference

Cannot cause any electrical, safety, or operational interference with air-

craft systems or surrounding flight operations

Safety

Compliance with the applicable Food and Drug Administration (FDA),

Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Federal Communications

Commission safety requirements and FAA safety and airworthiness re-

quirements

Environmental

Cannot pose environmental hazards

Table 4. Summary of Cost Performance Parameters

Cost Parameters

Requirements

Operations and Support

Costs

Operations and maintenance costs of less than $300 per takeoff and

landing

Unit Costs

Unit costs of $1 million or less for the 1,000

unit delivered and installed,

with an objective of $500,000 each

Installation

Ten days or less (preferably four days) for installation and checkout on

non-retrofitted aircraft; retrofitted aircraft: Eight hours or less (preferably

four hours)

2.3 System Descriptions

To meet the top-level system requirements laid out above in Tables 2-4, the contractors designed

their respective Phase II systems by progressing through a rigorous systems engineering devel-

opment process in which formal system requirements, preliminary design, and critical design re-

views were conducted. Specific entrance and exit criteria were used as decision gates for transi-

tioning from one milestone to the next.

Both contractors used legacy DIRCM-based military systems, updated to reflect commercializa-

tion requirements. DIRCM systems have been flown in combat situations by the United States

and allied military forces and were selected by the contractors to reduce technical and schedule

risks. They were the most reasonable choice constituting the best value for the end users. The

basic subsystems are threat detectors or sensors, a system controller or processor, and a counter-

measure subsystem. The fourth system component is the aircraft interface and communications

subsystem.

Details about the systems engineering development process and associated design reviews are available in the

System Performance section of this document.

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• The threat detector (or sensor) detects missiles.

• The system controller subsystem is the brain of the overall system. It manages all sub-

systems, monitors all data, makes decisions to declare threats, selects the proper method

or methods for countering those threats, assesses the countermeasure effectiveness, and

communicates threat events to the crew.

• The countermeasure subsystem uses a pointer/tracker and laser-based countermeasure to

force the missile to miss its intended target: the aircraft.

• The aircraft interface and communications subsystem electrically integrates the system

with the aircraft, drawing the necessary power from the aircraft. The communications in-

frastructure provides the means to communicate or alert the crew, air traffic control, and

law enforcement agencies of MANPADS events.

The contractors conducted individual studies and reached different conclusions as to the better

architectural approach to meeting the program’s requirements. The primary architectural differ-

ence between the two contractors is in the aircraft installation approach. BAE’s system compo-

nents are installed in various locations on the airframe (a distributed system). The majority of

NGC system components are installed in a single pod externally mounted to the airframe (a pod

or podded system).

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2.3.1 BAE Systems: JETEYE™ System Overview

The JETEYE™ system evolved from the U.S. Army ATIRCM system and is designed in a dis-

tributed manner: system components are installed in equipment racks in the cargo bay, the engi-

neering and electronic bay, and the flight deck area. The JETEYE™ system consists of a sensor

and nullification segment, an infrastructure segment, and an aircraft-specific installation kit, or

A-Kit. The sensor and nullification segment has a sensor subsystem, which detects and tracks

missiles launched at the host aircraft, and a nullification subsystem, which aims and fires a laser

at the missile, causing it to lose track of the aircraft and turn away; this is the BAE B-Kit. Figure

5 illustrates the distributed system architecture and shows how the system would be installed on

a Boeing 767.

Figure 5. BAE JETEYE™ Distributed Design as Installed on an American Airlines B767

Electronic Control

Unit & Jamhead

Control Unit

Lightning

Protection Unit

Aircraft Interface

Unit &

Transponder Unit

Flight Deck

Control Panel

Electronic Control

Unit & Jamhead

Control Unit

Lightning

Protection Unit

Aircraft Interface

Unit &

Transponder Unit

Flight Deck

Control Panel

Figure 6. BAE JETEYE™ Distributed Design Components

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2.3.2 Northrop Grumman Corporation: The Guardian™ System

The NGC Guardian™ System solution evolved from the U.S. Air Force LAIRCM system and

places the sensors and countermeasures components within an enclosed pod, as shown in Figure

7. The pod, with the flight deck indicator unit and aircraft memory module, constitutes the NGC

B-Kit. An adapter plate, wiring, aircraft interfaces, a transponder interface unit, and a glare panel

indicator/switch form the A-Kit. The side of the A-Kit adapter plate that attaches with the aircraft

is unique for each aircraft type. The pod is compatible with all modified commercial aircraft.

Figure 7. NGC Guardian™ System Pod Installed on a FedEx MD-11

Figure 8. NGC Guardian™ System Pod without Cover

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3 System Performance

This chapter explains the system engineering process used by DHS and the contractors in devel-

oping the systems, including the performance of the two prototype systems as assessed through

testing and evaluation activities.

The Counter-MANPADS system engineering approach has two components: management of

the process, which was the primary focus of the SPO; and the actual system engineering,

whereby the two contractor teams developed their systems by following a classic, methodical,

and rigorous system engineer process. Assessment of the data collected during contractor-

conducted/SPO-monitored and independent SPO-directed testing and evaluation indicate that the

two contractors’ Counter-MANPADS systems are able to counter the threat of MANPADS but

do not completely meet the Phase II requirements for effectiveness.

3.1 System Engineering Management

Prior to executing Phases I and II, the SPO requested the contractors develop System Engineer-

ing Management Plans (SEMP) detailing the management and processes necessary to systemati-

cally engineer the legacy military technologies into commercialized systems meeting the DHS

requirements. These plans included the system requirements analysis phase, the development

phase, and the testing and verification phase. The SPO reviewed the SEMPs and their supporting

documents (listed in Table 5) for soundness, completeness, and proper metrics for gauging de-

sign maturity.

Table 5. Documentation Required by DHS from Contractors

Document Title

Description

Objectives

System Engineering

Management Plan

The structure, policies, and proce-

dures to promote a diverse set of

activities for design, development,

and testing of the Counter-

MANPADS system

Provide technical program planning

and control, system engineering

process, and engineering specialty

integration

Concept of Operations The designed operating scenarios,

the operating sequence of events,

and the functions needed to be per-

formed by the system and the users

Provide high-level operating concepts

from a use-case perspective that can

be used to trade system functions

and to design system components

System Requirements

Document

The system requirements, specific

system design constraints, and test-

ing and verification strategy

Describe system requirements

through the use of legacy compo-

nents and constraints specific to

commercial aviation

Technical Performance

Measures

Metrics that can be used to monitor

the system design against key per-

formance parameters

Monitor the maturity levels of the de-

sign

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3.2 System Engineering Process

The contractor system engineering teams used a classic system engineering process that includes

a sequence of activities and decisions that iteratively transform operational needs into configured

system performance, operations and support, and cost requirements.

3.2.1 System Requirements, Design Analysis, and Trade Studies

Recommendations from formal trade studies that methodically identified practical alternatives

among requirements, technical objectives, design, program schedule, functional and performance

requirements, and life cycle costs support the system and component design decisions; Figure 9

shows the interaction among these parts of the systems engineering process. Example contractor

trade studies include:

• Sensor location and orientation to ensure countermeasure coverage meets requirement;

• Pointer/tracker location and quantity to ensure the design meets the requirement for han-

dling multiple missiles while still meeting the cost objectives; and

• Installation alternatives: a single pod; a partially-loaded pod supplemented by internally

mounted system components; or a fully distributed system in which system components

are installed throughout the airframe.

Concept of

Operations;

Customer

Requirements

Analysis

System

Architectural

Trades &

Analysis

Functional

Analysis &

Allocation

Design Synthesis

Figure 9. Classic System Engineering Process Focuses on Iterative Analyses & Trade Studies

3.2.2 System Engineering Technical Control

The Counter-MANPADS SPO used MIL-STD-1521B, Technical Reviews and Audits for Sys-

tems, Equipment, and Computer Software, and the principles of knowledge-based acquisition as

guides for conducting technical reviews to ensure the contractors followed a sound system engi-

neering process and to ensure the contractors met a number of entry and exit criteria before pro-

ceeding from one milestone to the next.

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The SPO managed the system requirements and contractor-derived requirements using Dynamic

Object-Oriented Requirements System (DOORS), a proven, standard off-the-shelf requirements

management tool. The contractors used similar tools such as System Level Automation Tool for

Engineers (SLATE) and Requirements Traceability and Management (RTM). These tools pro-

vide graphical and textual links between the system requirements, the lower component require-

ments, and the component specifications. They afford the SPO and the contractors a method for

verifying the system design against its requirements and specifications.

3.2.2.1 System Requirements Review

During Phase I, the contractors held System Requirements Reviews (SRR) to demonstrate to the

SPO that the system requirements they were working adequately met the system concept of op-

erations for commercial aviation. Both contractors met the entry and exit criteria established by

the SPO for each of the SRRs.

3.2.2.2 Preliminary Design Review

During Phase I, the contractors held Preliminary Design Reviews (PDR) to allow the SPO to re-

view their preliminary designs after they completed several trade studies (listed in Section 3.2.1)

assessing various functional allocation concepts. Both contractors met the entry and exit criteria

established by the SPO for each of the PDRs.

3.2.2.3 Critical Design Review

The SPO conducted Critical Design Reviews (CDR) of the contractors’ designs in an incre-

mental manner to reduce the overall complexity of the review and also to allow fabrication or

manufacturing of key subsystems early when they were deemed mature enough to proceed. Both

contractors met the entry and exit criteria established by the SPO for each of the CDRs.

3.2.2.4 Test Readiness Review

During testing, each contractor was subject to one or more Test Readiness Reviews (TRR) to en-

sure its systems, test plans and procedures, and safety plans were ready to proceed into major test

phases. Both contractors met the entry and exit criteria established by the SPO for each of the

TRRs.

3.2.2.5 Formal Qualification Review

Formal Qualification Reviews (FQR) are conducted to demonstrate that major subsystems and

the final systems meet the top-level requirements and specifications. The SPO initiated these re-

views with the contractors for the Developmental Verification Test (DVT), the Hardware-in-the-

Loop Test (HITL), and the contractor-conducted ground and flight test. These reviews are being

conducted as the test data are available and analyzed.

Figure 10 highlights the development process and the key technical reviews.

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PDR

SRR

CDR

TRR

FQR

System Level

Design

Requirements

Item Level Design

Requirements

All Design Requirements Complete

Components

Assemblies

Configuration Items

Subsystems

System Level

Fabricate, Integrate &

Test

Design

PDR

SRR

CDR

TRR

FQR

System Level

Design

Requirements

Item Level Design

Requirements

All Design Requirements Complete

Components

Assemblies

Configuration Items

Subsystems

System Level

Fabricate, Integrate &

Test

Design

Figure 10. System Engineering Process Flow & Verification Strategy

3.3 System Verification: Design & Performance Evaluations

System verification included component, subsystem, and system-level effectiveness and design

verifications, which both contractors conducted. The testing proceeded in stages from component

and software testing to system testing, increasing system capabilities and complexities from one

stage to the next. At each stage of component and subsystem verification testing, the contractors

conducted TRRs to determine the readiness of the system development, the test procedures, and

the available resources necessary to perform the test. This section highlights the key verification

approaches used by the SPO and the contractors. The contractors conducted some of the testing

with the SPO as witnesses; other tests, particularly the later ones, were conducted by the SPO

using independent test facilities.

3.3.1 Modeling and Simulation

Modeling and simulation (M&S) provides the best and most affordable means for designing and

evaluating system effectiveness and conducting verification in a laboratory environment. Both

contractors used M&S during the development phase. The SPO provided the contractors with

scenarios based on typical takeoff and landing profiles at four high-volume U.S. airports. Each

scenario was modeled with varying numbers of missiles launched from a combination of azi-

muths, launch elevations, and ranges with differing time of launch sequences (i.e., simultaneous

or delayed with differing delay times). Atmospheric conditions were modeled to account for dif-

ferences in season (winter, spring summer and fall), time of day (day/night), look down back-

grounds (urban, industrial and rural), look-up backgrounds (clear, bright, scattered, broken, over-

cast), ozone levels, and sun location (noon, sunrise and sunset). These scenarios resulted in over

55,000 combinations of these parameters and over a million simulated missile launches and

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countermeasures, ensuring a high degree of confidence in the assessment of the effectiveness of

each contractor’s designs.

The testing objectives were:

• To demonstrate the Counter-MANPADS systems performance and effectiveness in a

M&S laboratory environment

• To account for the true system design, the missile fly-out profiles, and the atmospherics

conditions commensurate with commercial aviation, including the infrared signatures of

the aircraft engines

3.3.2 Developmental Verification Testing

DVT verifies the system design against its specifications and requirements, to the extent possi-

ble, in a laboratory environment. DVTs allowed the SPO an opportunity to assess the contrac-

tors’ progress toward resolving critical operational issues, the validity of the cost-performance

tradeoff decisions, the mitigation of technical risks, and the achievement of system maturity.

The testing objectives were:

• To verify the design meets the system technical requirements

• To determine if the system is prepared for field tests

Both contractors conducted DVTs and met the SPO’s expectations.

3.3.3 Hardware-in-the-Loop Testing

HITL testing verifies countermeasure effectiveness for a subset of the simulated engagement

scenarios performed under the M&S effort. HITL testing is conducted in a specific laboratory

that allows real missile seekers to be used in a realistic motion simulator for purpose of testing

the effectiveness of the countermeasure approach. The target, missile launch, flight, navigation,

and terminal maneuver are all simulated in real time. The actual laser and jam code of each con-

tractor’s Counter-MANPADS system were used to evaluate the effectiveness of the system

against real threat missile seekers. The testing scenario was a representative wide-body aircraft

flying a typical commercial airline airport departure. The tests were conducted in accordance

with test scenarios developed by the SPO and were conducted as an independent assessment.

The testing objectives were:

• To demonstrate the Counter-MANPADS system’s laser countermeasure perform-

ance/effectiveness in an HITL laboratory environment

• To collect data to support simulation validation

• To assess the system’s ability to meet the effectiveness requirements

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The HITL testing matrix included multiple missile launch aspects (45

increments around the

aircraft) and multiple ranges (1.2, 2.5, and 4.2 kilometers – typical short, medium, and long

ranges) as depicted in Figure 11. For each contractor, more than 5000 single missile and dual

missile shots using the required first- through third-generation missiles were tested at these test

points. The resultant probabilities of success in defeating these missile shots were then averaged

and compared to the system performance requirements. Please see the Classified Annex for test

results.

0°

225°

180°

45°

90°

315°

270°

135°

0°

225°

180°

45°

90°

315°

270°

135°

Figure 11. HITL Test Matrix Missile Launch Locations

3.3.4 Flight Tests

Flight testing verifies system pointing accuracy when the system is installed on an aircraft flying

in a subset of representative missile engagement patterns. Flight tests are conducted in a closed

airfield with the system installed on an aircraft. Ground-based missile simulators are used to test

the system’s installed effectiveness during flight.

The testing objectives were:

• To demonstrate end-to-end system performance of the Counter-MANPADS system

against ground-based missile simulators

• To collect data to support simulation validation

• To assess the system’s ability to meet the effectiveness requirements

The flight testing matrix included takeoff, landing, and level flight profiles for each contractor

aircraft using the same missile launch aspects and ranges as were tested in the HITL. Rather

than using real missile seekers as in the HITL testing, high-fidelity missile simulators represent-

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ing the same required first- through third-generation missiles were used. For each contractor,

more than 400 single missile and dual missile shots were tested at these test points. As in the

HITL, the resultant probabilities of success in defeating these missile shots were then averaged

and compared to the system performance requirements. In this venue, however, the entire in-

stalled system end-to-end performance is seen.

Though the data analysis is not yet complete, the emerging data show that as in the HITL, both

contractors meet the requirement for successfully countering single missile engagements but do

not meet the requirement for simultaneous time of impact dual missile engagements. Also, it

should be noted that the environment in which the test aircraft flew was a relatively sterile mili-

tary range environment. In order to understand the DIRCM Systems’ performance for the com-

mercial aircraft environment (high density air traffic, extensive clutter, etc.), further operational

testing is required at multiple select civilian locals. This will be accomplished in Phase III of the

Counter-MANPADS Program.

As part of flight testing, ground testing was also performed. Effective Counter-MANPADS Sys-

tem (spatial) coverage was determined, with SPO witness, during contractor-conducted ground

testing. This performance requirement is very important, for unless the Counter-MANPADS

System can “see” the missile threat, it cannot countermeasure it. (It is understood that where

there is no ‘coverage”, the effectiveness is necessarily zero.) Of note here, is the fact that in or-

der to balance life-cycle costs with commercial airline operational needs, both contractors chose

single-turret designs. With both contractors putting their single laser countermeasures tracking

turret on the belly of the aircraft, anti-missile coverage above the aircraft is limited because of

aircraft structure blocking the line-of-sight required for the Counter-MANPADS Systems to

“see”, track, and counter any threat generally above the waterline of the aircraft. Therefore, in-

stead of meeting the requirement of 360

coverage in both azimuth and elevation, both contrac-

tors’ systems only have coverage (generally) below the aircraft waterline. This limitation, how-

ever, is mitigated by the fact that commercial airlines fly their airport departures and arrivals us-

ing very limited banking, making this limited spatial coverage a system effectiveness issue only

at very low altitudes, essentially within airport boundaries where the missile threat is minimal.

3.3.5 Functional and Physical Configuration Audits

Government functional and physical audits verify that objective evidence is available to verify

the as-built system against its functional and physical design and manufacturing specifications.

The objectives of the configuration audits are to:

• Verify that the configuration item’s actual performance complies with its hard-

ware/software requirements and interface requirements specifications

• Verify that the hardware or computer software performs as required by its func-

tional/allocated configuration identification

• Verify a technical understanding is reached on the validity and the degree of complete-

ness of the software test reports (software only)

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The audits are complete, all deficiencies have been identified and the contractors are in the proc-

ess of closing action items.

3.4 System Assessment

Technology maturity is determined using the DHS S&T Directorate’s program management

model for Technology Readiness Level (TRL) assessment, shown in Figure 12. At least one

Counter-MANPADS Phase II system has achieved TRL 7.

Phase III of the program will ma-

ture the technology to TRL 9 as certain requirements are thoroughly verified and correlated with

additional operational data and live fire tests. Please see Classified Annex for detailed test re-

sults.

Figure 12. Counter-MANPADS Technology has Achieved TRL 7

TRL 7: Prototype near, or at, planned operational system level. Represents a major step up from TRL 6, re-

quiring demonstration of an actual system prototype in an operational environment. TRL 8: Technology has been

proven to work in its final form and under expected operational deployment conditions. In most cases, this TRL

represents completion of system development. Examples include test and evaluation of the system in its intended

system configuration and operational environment. TRL 9: Actual application of the technology in its final form and

under mission conditions, in accordance with the user’s CONOPS.

Source: DHS S&T Directorate Program Management Model for Technology Readiness Level (TRL) Assess-

ment, September 1, 2005

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4 Air Carrier Suitability

This chapter reports on the extent to which the evaluated systems are suitable for the commercial

air carrier environment, including aircraft compatibility, air carrier operations, system safety,

system security, and emergency ground notification. This chapter includes a discussion on the

systems’ applicability on wide- and narrow-body aircraft, environmental qualification assess-

ments, and certification by the FAA for airworthiness and safety. It also shows the importance of

integrating the new system within the existing framework.

The SPO defined parameters to measure and assess Counter-MANPADS systems in the com-

mercial airline environment based on aircraft compatibility and air carrier operations. Aircraft

compatibility covers the integration, installation, and certification of this equipment on the air-

craft types utilized by air carriers. For air carrier operations, the SPO assessed the reliability,

maintainability, and supportability of this equipment with respect to the air carrier operating en-

vironment.

4.1 Aircraft Compatibility

The compatibility of the systems with the existing airframes, that is, the physical aircraft, is vital

to the success of any system deployment. This requires the system to be capable of installation

and that installation not cause any environmental or certification problems. Each of these items is

considered below.

4.1.1 Fleet Assessment

DHS provided the contractors with a list of airframes with which the systems should be compati-

ble. Both contractors conducted fleet assessments and documented the findings of those assess-

ments, in respect to their individual systems. These assessments were used to develop installation

and interface approaches, power considerations, system weight breakdown for the various instal-

lation configurations, and the issues each associated with a fleet-wide retrofit.

Both contractor teams also completed an installation demonstration, completed initial installa-

tion, conducted flight tests with the equipment, and are in the process of obtaining airworthiness

certifications from the FAA. BAE partnered with American Airlines on the installation design

and implementation on a B767-200 series aircraft. NGC partnered with FedEx on the installation

design and implementation on an MD-11 and a B747-300.

The data gathered during Phase II indicate that the two systems can be implemented on the ap-

plicable wide- and narrow-body aircraft in the commercial fleet, with a few issues to be consid-

ered further. The SPO will continue working these issues as appropriate during Phase III.

Aircraft type and model numbers used in this document are preceded by a B for Boeing, A for Airbus, and

MD for McDonnell Douglas.

For planning purposes, the DHS SPO evaluated the demographics of the US Carrier fleets using the Back Avia-

tion™ Schedule databases for 2004 and 2005 and identified the industry distinctions between narrow-body jets (sin-

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• Structural Impact – the designs of the structural and electrical provisions can be easily

adapted to other aircraft types to provide a common interface and interchangeability of

the system components; space constraint issues must be addressed on smaller narrow-

body aircraft types.

• Drag Impact – installations on the B747, B767, and MD-11 meet the threshold require-

ment of one percent; the drag increase on narrow-bodies may exceed the one percent

threshold requirement.

• Weight Impact – both installations comfortably meet the threshold requirement of 800

pounds and approach the desired 500-pound objective.

• Electrical Power Impact – both systems meet the requirement to utilize aircraft electri-

cal power under normal operating conditions.

• Installation Timeline – both installations comfortably meet the threshold requirement of

ten days.

4.1.2 Environmental Qualification Assessments

Environmental qualification is conducted on a component or system level in a laboratory envi-

ronment to evaluate performance characteristics of airborne equipment under a range of condi-

tions representative of the installed environment. Successful tests establish confidence in the sys-

tem’s ability to perform its functions when installed on the aircraft. The commercial aviation in-

dustry’s recognized standard for environmental qualification, used by the SPO as a baseline, is

DO-160, Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for Airborne Equipment, published by

RTCA, Incorporated.

Table 6 lists the categories tested during the Environmental Qualification

Assessment.

Table 6. Environmental Qualification Testing Categories

Temperature

Voltage Spikes

Icing

Altitude

Electromagnetic Susceptibility

Fluids Corrosion

Operation Shocks

Electromagnetic Emissions

Sand and Dust

Crash Safety

Explosion Proofness

Fungus Resistance

Vibration

Waterproofness

Salt Spray

Power Inputs

Lightning Strikes

gle aisle, Boeing 737 and larger), wide-body jets (double aisle), and small regional jets, finding this to be a very use-

ful construct.

RTCA is a private, not-for-profit corporation that functions as a Federal Advisory Committee. It develops

consensus-based recommendations on contemporary aviation issues, which are often used by the FAA as the basis

for policy, program, and regulatory decisions and by the private sector as the basis for development, investment, and

other business decisions. Since RTCA is not an official agency of the U.S. Government, its recommendations are not

regarded as statements of official government policy unless so enunciated by the U.S. Government organization or

agency having statutory jurisdiction over any matters to which the recommendations relate. See http://www.rtca.org.

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Wherever possible, existing data from the contractors’ legacy military systems were used. Most

individual components of each system have been tested and meet the requirements of DO-160.

There are several key components within each system that have not yet been adequately tested,

and the functionality of those components under varying environmental conditions is paramount

to overall system functionality. Tests of these remaining components will be completed during

the summer 2006.

4.1.3 FAA Certification

Under the Federal Aviation Regulations, the FAA type-certifies every aircraft for airworthiness

at the time of manufacture. For major changes to the aircraft type design, other than the Original

Equipment Manufacturer (OEM), the modifier must apply to the FAA for a Supplemental Type

Certificate (STC), which establishes, based on extensive testing and analyses, that the modifica-

tions meet the applicable airworthiness requirements.

The ability to obtain an STC is a key

factor in the aircraft suitability assessment because no air carrier can operate without an STC ap-

proval of the Counter-MANPADS modification.

The FAA recognizes that it does not have the expertise or standards by which to evaluate mili-

tary countermeasures. Accordingly, Section 4026(b)(2) of the Intelligence Reform and Terror-

ism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458) directs the FAA to accept DHS certification that

counter-MANPADS systems are effective and functional to defend commercial aircraft against

MANPADS. DHS has evaluated system performance, hardware, and software throughout Phase

II, and will continue its assessment throughout Phase III. Once all tests are complete and if the

data indicate that the system performs according to Phase II systems requirements, DHS will

provide a letter to the FAA to that effect and requesting that the FAA accept this letter as a

statement of DHS’s provisional certification that the system is effective and functional to defend

commercial aircraft against MANPADS and issue the STC with the limitation that the STC be

used strictly in support of the DHS Phase III evaluations. This letter and the FAA’s airworthiness

assessments will form the basis for the issuance of the STCs necessary to support production de-

ployment.

Since an STC approval of any aircraft modification is necessary for any Part 121 air carrier to

operate that aircraft, STCs are necessary for the Phase II installations to proceed to Phase III.

These STCs are anticipated in the spring of 2006. It should be noted that the STCs issued at the

end of Phase II will contain limitations. These STCs will strictly represent airworthiness com-

pliance with FAA’s 14 CFR Part 25 regulations.

An STC is a document issued by the Federal Aviation Administration approving a product (aircraft, engine, or

propeller) modification. The STC defines the product design change, states how the modification affects the existing

type design, and lists effected serial number. It also identifies the certification basis listing specific regulatory com-

pliance for the design change. Information contained in the certification basis is helpful for those applicants propos-

ing subsequent product modifications and evaluating certification basis compatibility with other STC modifications.

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4.1.3.1 Process Description

DHS began coordinating with the FAA’s Aircraft Certification Offices (ACO) early in the pro-

gram to ensure FAA perspectives and interests were included in this process. The FAA provided

input for the Phase II solicitation requirements and was a part of developing the lower-level re-

quirements. In particular, the SPO and FAA worked closely to derive system requirements in the

areas of flight crew interface and laser safety.

Each contractor team followed a standard FAA STC application process for certifying non-

essential equipment. Even for a non-essential system, this involves a rigorous effort consisting of

structural, aerodynamic, and electrical analyses, hazard and safety analyses, detailed design ap-

provals of each component, conformity inspections of parts and installations, environmental

qualification and other component level tests, FAA test plan approvals, and finally, aircraft

ground and flight tests. Table 7 summarizes the major STC milestones in Phase II.

Table 7. STC Process and Status Summary

STC Milestone

Description of Efforts

Project Inception

• Submit FAA Certification Plan with applicable airworthiness requirements

and methods of compliance

• Define system and installation and identify unique certification issues

• FAA opens STC project and approves FAA Certification Plan

Design Analysis

• Conduct structural analyses on component attachments and installations

• Conduct electrical analyses to ensure power margins and electrical safety

• Conduct computational fluid dynamics to predict impact on drag and han-

dling qualities

• Conduct hazard analyses to ensure safe operation and failure modes

Component Tests

• Review/approve component designs

• Manufacture parts and conduct FAA inspections

• Submit component test plans/procedures for FAA approval

• Conduct environmental qualification tests

• Conduct static structural tests

Flight Tests

• Complete installation and conduct FAA inspections

• Submit ground and flight test plans for FAA approval

• Conduct ground electromagnetic and functional checks to clear the air-

craft for flight

• Conduct FAA flight tests: remaining electromagnetic compatibility tests,

climb checks to verify Aircraft Flight Manual (AFM) performance, handling

qualities checks such as stalls and sideslips, and high speed vibration and

buffet checks

• Conduct DHS performance flight tests

Final Approval

• Submit final data and reports to FAA

• DHS submits approval letter to FAA

• FAA issues STC

4.1.3.2 Future FAA Certifications

Both contractors conducted extensive fleet surveys to understand the efforts and costs for both

new and amended STCs, and thus have laid the ground work for future certifications, should the

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need arise. Regardless, the cost to obtain all such STCs is a near-term cost for the deployment of

Counter-MANPADS. FAA resources and aircraft priority are also factors that must be consid-

ered for any type of deployment scenario.

The three airframes being certified by the FAA in Phase II, the B767-200, B747-300, and MD-

11, represent less than five percent of the entire U.S. commercial fleet of wide- and narrow-body

aircraft types and series. Figure 13 illustrates the U.S. commercial aircraft fleet composition,

highlighting the three STCs that form a part of this program. Many aircraft types (e.g., B737,

B747, B757) consist of a family of aircraft series, each requiring FAA-approved amendments to

their respective STCs for Counter-MANPADS implementation.

Separate STCs are required for each of the contractors’ solutions (and for any other solutions de-

veloped by other contractors). As a part of their fleet compatibility assessments, the two contrac-

tors have assessed the certification issues associated with the STCs and considered them in their

cost projections.

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Figure 13. U.S. Commercial Fleet Distributions

4.2 Air Carrier Operations

As discussed in Section 2.1, Military Versus Commercial Environments, commercial Counter-

MANPADS prototypes are variants of existing military systems. These legacy military systems

were designed to meet specific mission needs, operational regimes, environmental extremes, and

logistic support infrastructures common to military operations. As a result, military DIRCM sys-

tem requirements are optimized for the unique military environment. By contrast, the commer-

cial air carrier industry depends on effective systems with high reliability and low Total Operat-

ing Cost (TOC). This section describes the areas and efforts completed to adapt military systems

into the commercial environment.

4.2.1 Minimizing Impact to Airline Operations

As mentioned above, both contractors conducted detailed analyses of the fleet and of the

Counter-MANPADS program to ensure that any new system would integrate easily into the ex-

isting operations of the commercial air industry. The SPO and contractors studied operations and

maintenance approaches to minimize impacting the industry.

BACK Aviation, FLEET Worldwide Commercial Aircraft Ownership & Transactions Database, October

2005, Washington, D.C.

A321

A300, -600, -600R, -B4

A318

F100

MD90

A310-300

A310-200

A319

A320, -200, -232

MD80, MD88

MD11

MD10, -10, -30

DC10, -10, -30

B747-400

B747-200, -200F

B747-100

B737-800

B747-300

B737-900

B737-700

B737-500

B737-400

B737-300

B737-200

B727-200, -200ADV

B727-100

B717-200

A330

B757-200, -223

B767-200, -200ER, -

223ER, -223STD

B767-300, -300ER, -323ER

B767-400, -400ER

DC9, -15, -30, -40, -50

DC8, -71, -73

B757-300

B777-200, -200ER, -

200IGW

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4.2.1.1 Understanding Aircraft Operations and Maintenance

Matching an airline’s route structure with the appropriate aircraft to meet market demand is a

complex process. Thousands of constraints and variables affect each airline’s schedule. Chang-

ing or restructuring one variable can have a cascading effect on an air carrier’s entire system. For

example, a maintenance problem can lead to substituting an aircraft type, which in turn may af-

fect aircrew requirements, overnight maintenance schedules, seating availability, and a host of

other changes throughout the carrier’s system.

Aircraft are generally not route-specific. A wide-body aircraft flying from New York to London

one day could fly from New York to Los Angeles the next. Aircraft rotate through the system to

support the airline’s route structure and aircrew logistics and to allow performance of routine

maintenance.

Although individual aircraft are not confined to specific routes, there are routes that require cer-

tain aircraft types, effecting maintenance resource scheduling. Certain twin-engine aircraft must

undergo an FAA-mandated check prior to flying routes that include points more than 60 minutes

from a suitable airport, such as trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific routes.

A number of additional operational issues arise when a new system or component is added to an

aircraft. The aircrew must be trained on use of the system; maintenance personnel must be

trained on repair the system; and schedulers must accommodate any operational issues into the

air carrier’s route, provisioning, and maintenance systems, including ensuring the properly-

trained aircrew and maintenance personnel are where the planes are.

Deploying and maintaining Counter-MANPADS technology requires close coordination with

airline operators to:

• Be consistent with current airline operations

• Ensure flexibility in Counter-MANPADS system deployment

• Optimize the concepts of operations

• Minimize training requirements

A key element of airline operations is when and for how long an airplane will be taken out of

service so that a Counter-MANPADS system installation can be performed. The best solution is

to perform the modification when the aircraft is already scheduled to be out of service for main-

tenance, thereby not adding any significant additional time to the scheduled out of service event.

Thus, deploying Counter-MANPADS systems consistent with current airline operations will help

limit the economic effect on the airlines. Table 8 provides an overview of typical aircraft mainte-

nance actions, effects on aircraft scheduling, and service intervals.

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Table 8. Aircraft Maintenance and Service Plan

Type of Maintenance Check

Aircraft Scheduling Effects

Service Interval

Pre-Flight Inspection

None

Before every flight

Line Maintenance Tasks

Overnight

45 hours (domestic)

A-Check

Overnight

200-450 flight hours

B-Check

Overnight

450-1,000 flight hours

C-Check

Out of Service 3-5 Days

12-15 months

D-Check/Inspection

Out of Service over 30 Days

2 years

Major Overhaul

Out of Service over 30 Days

2.5-8 years

Each airline has its own maintenance program for each type and variant of aircraft, and the fre-

quency of maintenance checks vary from airline to airline. Complicating the scheduling and se-

curity issues, airlines are now outsourcing more such work. Consequently, establishing deploy-

ment schedules and priorities will require close-knit cooperation across industry, and even inter-

national, boundaries.

4.2.1.2 Minimizing Installation Impacts

The SPO worked closely with the contractors to develop methods and approaches for mitigating

the impact that Counter-MANPADS system deployment would have on the airlines and their op-

erations. Two important factors are provided as illustration: installation approach and installa-

tion timing.

Due to the complexity of the original installation, including structural modifications for the wir-

ing, the system will have to be installed during heavy maintenance (i.e., C- or D-Checks, as

shown in Table 8). There is a fixed, limited number of aircraft of each type that can go through

heavy maintenance each year. This number is constrained both by the capacity of the heavy

maintenance facilities and by the ability of airlines to have specific aircraft be unavailable for an

extended period of time. Based on preliminary analyses conducted in Phase II, approximately

550-575 aircraft normally go through heavy maintenance each year.

An additional constraint on installation is the ability of the contractors and the FAA to develop

and certify installation for each unique aircraft type and series (e.g., 737-300, 737-800, 747-200).

The STC must be granted before the aircraft can return to revenue service. Additionally, timing

STCs for large fleets such as 737s and 757s becomes the pacing factor in establishing a firm

completion objective due to a set number of annual heavy maintenance visits for those specific

types of aircraft.

4.2.1.3 Minimizing Maintenance Impact

The Minimum Equipment List (MEL) is the FAA-approved list of the equipment that is required

for an aircraft to depart an airport gate. The MEL identifies the total number of system-specific

pieces of equipment installed (e.g., four generators), the number required for flight, and both op-

Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics; Form 41 Data.

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erations and maintenance procedures to be followed if the equipment is inoperative. If an item is

not available or not working, the flight would either not be able to depart or would be grounded

until the inoperable system was fixed or replaced, based on the MEL category of the item in

question. Both contractors established that Counter-MANPADS systems are Category C sys-

tems, meaning that they are conditionally critical systems. Category C systems are either: a non-

essential redundant system; a system that may become essential due to routing, weather, or other

inter-related systems; or a system experiencing some other temporary condition. Weather radar is

good example of a conditionally critical system. Category C systems must be repaired or re-

placed within ten days.

If a the decision is made to make the Counter-MANPADS systems critical equipment (must be

operational), then operational status could impact timely departures and on-time performance of

the airlines, and it could dramatically affect the flight line maintenance, storage needs, and other

logistical support activities of the airlines. Further, if the malfunctioning component is covered

by International Trafficking in Arms Regulations (ITAR), specific procedures to ensure technol-

ogy protection must be included and followed by the airline. This has implications in terms of

spare parts distribution, secure storage, and qualified maintenance personnel.

4.2.2 Operational Logistics Support

Operational logistics support refers to those things that have to be done by the airlines to keep

the aircraft in service once the system is installed. This includes maintaining the system, replac-

ing the systems, and appropriate training. Since operational logistics support requirements are

major cost drivers for sustaining a system, DHS tasked both contractors with identifying specific

operations and support activities related to Counter-MANPADS flight operations. With the help

of their airline partners, both contractors developed appropriate approaches and processes for

supporting the systems in the commercial environment. Each adequately described how its sys-

tem interfaces with the existing support infrastructure and maintenance systems used by air car-

riers, as summarized in Table 9.

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Table 9. Operational Logistics Support Elements and Contractor Approaches

Support Element

Description

Approach & Assessment

Technical Data/

Instructions for

Continued

Airworthiness (ICA)

These are developed from Origi-

nal Equipment Manufacturer

(OEM) source data and the modi-

fier’s installation data incorpo-

rated into the required FAA

documents.

ICA documentation was sufficient to perform

Phase II flight tests and operational suitability

assessments, but numerous

tasks/procedures require correction prior to

commercial airline use.

Individual air carriers have differ-

ent requirements for training ma-

terial (e.g., printed courseware vs.

computer-based training).

ICA documentation will be used for develop-

ing training materials and can be delivered to

air carriers when needed to support the

Counter-MANPADS system deployment and

fielding.

Training

Requirements and

Development

Air carriers use a combination of

in-house and outsourced infra-

structure to support their opera-

tions.

Each contractor addressed sparing levels

needed for varying numbers of systems in-

stalled in the commercial airline fleet and the

positioning of repair facilities and spare parts

needed domestically and internationally as

the number of installed systems increase.

Supply Chain

Management and

Infrastructure

Support

A phased implementation plan is

needed to activate depot (mainte-

nance, repair, and overhaul or

third-party vendor) support. Select

individuals within each air car-

rier’s support organization will

need visibility into inventory loca-

tions and quantities.

Both contractors addressed depot-level

hardware and software maintenance, includ-

ing software tools necessary to maintain and

upgrade embedded system software.

Depot/OEM Sup-

port and Facilities

Each air carrier maintenance or-

ganization will use existing facili-

ties and hangar environments to

perform maintenance and supply

support operations.

Both contractor teams developed depot repair

and supply support concepts using the exist-

ing airline infrastructure. However, contractor

depot/OEM and inventory management facili-

ties must be expanded to accommodate in-

creased workload for Line Replaceable Unit

(LRU) repairs and to support domestic and

international airline operations.

Special Ground

Support and Test

Equipment

Air carrier maintenance organiza-

tions prefer as few specialized

pieces of equipment as possible.

Both contractors achieved the objective to

minimize the need for special ground support

and test equipment on the flight line.

Packaging, Han-

dling, Shipping and

Transportation

Total asset visibility concepts will

be exploited during shipping and

transporting components to mini-

mize loss of critical assets.

Both contractors followed commercial indus-

try standards for packaging, shipping, and

tracking the assets.

Demodification and

Disposal

At the end of useful life, systems

must be disposed of in a way that

minimizes liability due to envi-

ronmental, safety, security, and

health issues.

Both contractors addressed de-modification

and disposal to minimize liability due to envi-

ronmental, safety, security, and health issues.

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4.2.3 Maintenance Approach

Maintainability is an important focus area for the program. DHS tasked both contractors with

developing maintenance strategies that fit into the existing airline maintenance environment.

Both contractors used the established two-level model (flight line/base and component mainte-

nance), which is consistent across the airline industry. Table 10 shows approaches to the four

primary maintenance elements.

Table 10. Approaches to Maintenance Elements

Maintenance

Element

Approaches

Manpower and

Personnel

• Both contractors, in coordination with their air carrier partners, determined

that additional airline staffing and special mechanic qualifications would not

be required to support operations for the installed Counter-MANPADS

system.

• Systems can be maintained with one to four personnel depending on the

LRU requiring replacement.

Unscheduled

Maintenance

• In most cases, unscheduled maintenance tasks can be performed at the gate

or during overnight maintenance checks.

• If unscheduled maintenance cannot be accomplished within the available

gate time, the repair may be deferred under the authority of the MEL.

o Both contractors classified their systems to allow dispatch relief for up to

10 calendar days for the operator to repair the countermeasure system (re-

ferred to as a Category C system).

o This MEL approach enables the system to be operationally available with-

out imposing delays to takeoff or landing preparations.

Scheduled

Maintenance

• The Phase II performance-based solicitation established a goal for scheduled

maintenance to occur during prescribed inspection/maintenance

intervals.

• Both contractors minimized scheduled maintenance.

• However, both systems require line maintenance to inspect and clean the

optical sensors and the pointer/track head optical window. This task may

have to be performed on a daily or more frequent basis (between flights),

which will be challenging for the airlines.

Maintenance Time To

Repair (MTTR)

• The key parameter for maintainability is MTTR validated through a

mechanical and testability maintenance demonstration.

• DHS required unscheduled flight-line maintenance to take 60 minutes or less

with an objective of no more than 30 minutes.

4.2.4 Reliability

Commercial aircraft each log approximately 3,000 to 4,500 hours of flight time each year. The

operating routines of commercial aircraft vary widely by aircraft model. Narrow-body aircraft

like the MD-80, B737, and A318 fly shorter routes, have shorter flight times (2-3 hours dura-

tion), and make several flights per day. Conversely, wide-body aircraft like the B767, B777,

B747, and A330 fly longer routes, have longer flight times, and make fewer flights per day.

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Based on this information, the Counter-MANPADS program established a threshold reliability of

3,000 hours MFHBF, with an objective of 4,500 hours.

The currently-fielded military Counter-MANPADS systems has a mean time between failure of

approximately 300 flight hours with the system operating continuously. Because commercial air-

craft operations and environmental conditions are not quite as severe as the military environ-

ment, the initial fielded reliability of the commercial Counter-MANPADS systems is expected to

be better than that experienced by military systems. The SPO predicts that the initial fielded

Phase II Counter-MANPADS have a reliability of approximately 500 MFHBF with the system

operating continuously. Significant improvement is gained when the commercial aircraft operat-

ing environments are considered, but even so, this improved level of reliability is insufficient for

the commercial operating environment. The cost impacts associated with low reliability (impact

to revenue operations and maintenance) are discussed in Section 5.4.

4.2.4.1 Incorporating Sleep Mode

Aircraft are not vulnerable to a MANPADS missile attack at cruise altitude. Both contractors

have developed a “sleep mode” concept wherein certain components of the Counter-MANPADS

system are powered down when the aircraft is at altitudes where it is not vulnerable—effectively

increasing system availability to meet the requirements of the airlines. In a normal commercial

flight profile, the aircraft spends a relatively short period climbing to cruise altitude and descend-

ing for landing. Analysis of this concept has indicated the potential to increase initial reliability

of commercial Counter-MANPADS systems installed on wide-body aircraft to about 1,000

MFHBF.

Sleep mode is an operational concept that is essential to making Counter-MANPADS systems

commercially viable and affordable. The analysis and projection of total ownership costs de-

pends on achieving and exceeding the stated Phase II reliability threshold requirements. The

concept is straightforward from a reliability perspective, but thorough evaluation of system per-

formance over an extended period is necessary to ensure that there are no detrimental effects on

components from repeated power-up and power-down cycling.

4.2.4.2 Reliability Growth

As part of Phase III, a limited number of prototype Counter-MANPADS systems will be flown

on operational aircraft. This will provide an opportunity to further evaluate system suitability to

the commercial airline environment, particularly the sleep mode concept. With the operation of

multiple aircraft over a nine-month period, reliability growth is expected to achieve approxi-

mately 1,250 MFHBF for wide-body aircraft.

A separate dedicated reliability growth development test effort is also planned during Phase III.

This aspect of the program will put systems through unique testing regimes in the laboratory un-

A “failure” means that the system stops working; a program requirement met by both contractors is that a fail-

ure cannot negatively affect the aircraft’s ability to fly. After system failure, it must be maintained; see Table 10 for

information on unscheduled maintenance.

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der stressing conditions, which should grow wide-body reliability by nearly a factor of two to

achieve a MFHBF of approximately 2,500 hours. These Phase III reliability enhancements are an

essential step towards the commercialization of these systems.

Narrow-body, short-haul aircraft are less likely to achieve the threshold requirement during

Phase III. To achieve the reliability requirement for all aircraft types, additional operations and

reliability testing will be necessary beyond that which is planned for Phase III.

4.3 System Safety

To operate in a commercial aviation environment, the Counter-MANPADS systems must meet

the highest standards of safety. Meeting these standards is critical, not only to maintain the con-

fidence of the flying public, but also because of the liability issues that exist in the commercial

aviation sector.

During Phase II, the SPO required mishap risks to be identified, evaluated, and mitigated to an

acceptable level as defined by industry standards. The contractors were tasked with determining

the applicable requirements and associated regulatory agencies, the risk assessment approach,

key hazards and mitigations, and verifying that their system is safe. To evaluate the contractors’

approaches, the SPO formed a Safety Working Group comprised of specialists from the FAA’s

certification divisions, the FAA’s Civil Aerospace Medical Institute, the FAA’s Flight Standards

group, and the FDA Center for Devices and Radiological Health.

The safety assessments consider the deployment and operation of these systems on air carriers in

the NAS. Thus, the safety assessments consider the Counter-MANPADS equipment and its im-

pact on the aircraft on which it is installed, the crew and passengers of other airplanes operating

in the NAS, maintainers, air traffic controllers, and the environment as well as occupational haz-

ards. The Phase II findings are summarized in

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Table 11.

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Table 11. Phase II System Safety Findings

Safety Elements

Phase II Findings

System Safety

Assessment

• Both contractors successfully demonstrated that the system design and op-

eration are safe and suitable for the commercial aircraft operating

environment.

• The contractors have defined the applicable regulatory requirements of the

FAA, Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Occupational Safety & Health

Administration, and the Environmental Protection Agency and have demon-

strated compliance with those regulatory requirements.

Laser Safety

Assessment

• The Counter-MANPADS systems emit laser radiation during airborne opera-

tions. Laser products are regulated by the FDA; American National Stan-

dards Institute (ANSI) standards provide operating requirements and guide-

lines for the safe use and outdoor operation of lasers.

• The contractors’ lasers meet the most stringent FDA and ANSI standards.

The probability of inadvertent laser activation, in accordance with DHS re-

quirements, is less than one in ten million.

• Laser safety training is a necessary part of overall Counter-MANPADS train-

ing.

Other System Safety

Issues

• International operational approval and compliance with the National Envi-

ronmental Policy Act will be addressed in Phase III.

4.4 System Security

Because the systems are based on military technology and contain both critical unclassified in-

dustrial technology and classified military hardware and software, the system must be fully se-

cured. This type of security is intrinsic to the military operations and support system, but not

seen before in the civilian airline industry. Further, law and federal regulations require the pro-

tection of sensitive technology and classified data. Both contractors were tasked with developing

a plan to provide comprehensive protection of system integrity, performance, and critical tech-

nologies. The approach must demonstrate the ability to prevent or delay exploitation of Counter-

MANPADS critical technology. Both contractors are making progress with technology protec-

tion by working directly with the appropriate DoD security offices, however the current mitiga-

tion approaches are not compatible with airline operations today. During Phase III, the ap-

proaches will be married with airline operations, including considerations due to the different

levels and types of security for commercial aircraft on the tarmac as compared with the military.

Current approaches would require security guards to ensure the systems are protected; this is

cost-prohibitive in the commercial environment.

System security is a major component of Phase III.

4.5 Emergency Ground Notification

A missile attack will disrupt the NAS. In the event of an attack, designated officials on the

ground must be provided unambiguous data as quickly as possible so they may respond effec-

tively. The accuracy and timeliness of this data will directly affect the safety of other aircraft and

infrastructure, particularly in the case of a large-scale multi-airport or multi-aircraft attack. False

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notifications resulting from inappropriate triggering of Counter-MANPADS systems will ad-

versely effect law enforcement readiness and undermine confidence in the systems.

The Phase II solicitation required the ability to notify ground personnel in the event of a

MANPADS attack for several reasons: to notify and protect other aircraft in nearby areas, to

correlate similar incidents in real-time at other airports, and potentially to locate and apprehend

terrorists. Automatic notification is required to facilitate notification and minimize pilot work-

load during takeoffs and landings, where pilot workload is highest. This capability is known as

EGN.

Using existing technology and infrastructure for automatic attack notification is the most cost-

effective approach. The SPO, in coordination with the FAA, elected to utilize the existing ATC

identification and alert system currently used for emergencies (code 7700). On receipt of such a

notification, an air traffic controller would then confirm the alert with the pilot of the alerting

aircraft before acting to ensure safe air operations and notifying law enforcement agencies. These

emergencies are broadcast to other aviation stakeholders over the Domestic Event Network

(DEN) to facilitate inter-agency communication and quick response.

The Phase II requirement for false notification is set at no more than one false notification for

every 1,000,000 flights, where one flight is defined as one takeoff and landing. Test data indicate

that the systems do not meet the requirement at this time. Additional tests and analyses during

Phase III will aid in determining the most practical design to produce the desired false and true

positive notification rates. Full implementation on a large scale requires certain more advanced

issues be more fully addressed:

• The current EGN is limited to an automatic notification of ATC; to maximize the utility

of this information, dissemination to other intelligence and law enforcement is needed.

• False notification of a Counter-MANPADS attack can have serious economic conse-

quences if the result is closed airspace and delayed, diverted, or cancelled flights. For

Phase II, the contractors have shown compliance with the false notification requirement

analytically. Test data, however, indicate that the systems may not meet this requirement;

in actual flight; thus, this functionality requires further evaluation in Phase III.

• The EGN CONOPS for the response and dissemination of information on the ground

level requires further development.

Phase III will aid in determining the exact information needed by law enforcement and intelli-

gence agencies; examples include time, speed, position of the alerting aircraft, and the probable

launch point of the detected MANPADS.

4.6 Assessment and Future Plans

The system installation approaches are compatible with wide-body airframes, though there are

some concerns with smaller narrow-bodies. Environmental qualifications will be completed in

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the summer of 2006. FAA certification of the first two installations is anticipated in spring of

2006.

System reliability estimates fall short of the required threshold, reducing system availability and

increasing maintenance costs. During Phase III, data will be gathered to determine if the DIRCM

systems meet operational availability requirements.

Both contractors developed systems that can be integrated into the current logistics and mainte-

nance systems with few issues and the systems pose no major safety concerns.

System security is still being reviewed and will be worked during Phase III. The SPO will work

with the contractors and stakeholders during Phase III to further refine technology protection

measures and to develop proposals for legislative relief to these important constraints.

Preliminary data show that the current design may generate higher false notification rate than the

required threshold established by the SPO. DHS will continue to evaluate solutions to the EGN

issues during Phase III to ensure the correct officials receive notification of events.

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5 Cost Considerations

This chapter discusses estimated costs for deploying Counter-MANPADS systems in the

commercial aviation environment. Initial discussion focuses on the cost targets levied on the

development contractors and their ability to achieve the very aggressive cost thresholds

established for the program. Assumptions and conditions employed by the SPO are reviewed. To

illustrate the estimating process, a baseline scenario of 1,000 aircraft is used. Discussed in this

chapter are the total ownership costs, industrial base availability and utilization, sources of

data, and the cost drivers.

After assessing the cost data provided by both contractors, the SPO believes that at least one of

the two current contractors is capable of achieving the cost objectives. The cost threshold of

acquisition costs less than or equal to $1 million for the 1,000

unit can be met. The target can be

met under certain conditions. These conditions include:

• At least 92 percent learning curve is achieved in production

• A block of 1,000 units are ordered (bulk purchasing saves money, thereby reducing costs)

• A single contractor produces all 1,000 units

• All “other acquisition costs” are funded (Research Development Test and Evaluation

(RDT&E), which includes Supplemental Type Certificates, production start-up costs,

procurement of initial spares, etc.)

• All installations occur during regularly scheduled heavy maintenance checks

• Installations occur over 5-8 years and depends on the mix of chosen aircraft –

narrowbody vs. widebody

Note: The learning curve is the reduction in unit acquisition cost resulting from increased

production efficiencies due to repetitive processes.

The O&S cost threshold of less than $300 per flight can be met under the following conditions:

• Reliability growth projections are met or exceeded

• Commercial aviation fuel costs do not exceed $1.25/gallon

o Note: This was the assumption on which the threshold was based. The new fuel

cost assumption is $2.00/gallon in FY03 dollars. It equates to the currently seen

Please note: the dollar amounts used in this section are FY03 dollars and have not been adjusted for inflation. For

the sake of consistency throughout Phases I and II of the Program, it was agreed to continue to use FY03 dollars.

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$2.18/gallon in FY06 dollars. The result is that the fuel contribution to O&S costs

increases from 35 percent to around 50 percent of the total.

• Less than one percent drag is achieved after unit installation

• Labor projections for removal and replacement procedures are realized, resulting in

minimal lost revenue

• Equipment remains designated as “not flight critical”, allowing flights for up to ten days

before maintenance action

5.1 Top-Level Cost Thresholds

The SPO realized cost would be a key consideration in determining the viability of the Counter-

MANPADS equipment. Aggressive cost thresholds were established at the start of the program,

and revised at the outset of the system design and demonstration phase (phase II) of the program.

The single biggest driver of the total costs for the program is the number of units procured and

operated. A baseline acquisition of 1,000 units was used as the reference case for calculating the

ability to achieve the cost thresholds of $1 million dollars for the 1000

unit for acquisition cost

and $300 per flight (was $500 at start of Phase I) for O&S costs. The SPO cost estimate for out-

fitting 1,000 aircraft is based on data provided by the two Phase II contractors. Table 12 provides

a summary of the projected costs for the two specified affordability metrics. The key conditions

underlying the numbers are a continuous production line that realizes at least a 92 percent learn-

ing curve, and that the countermeasure cost is restricted solely to the countermeasure hardware

and installation costs.

Table 12. Top-Level Cost Thresholds

Cost Category

Value

Number of Aircraft

1000

Installed countermeasure cost for 1000

unit

$1 Million

O&S Cost per Flight

$348

To ensure the accuracy and credibility of the overall program cost estimates, the SPO established

a highly-focused cost analysis and estimating environment for the Counter-MANPADS program,

driven by the established cost thresholds. Each contractor was tasked to develop and deliver

comprehensive, detailed Life Cycle Cost (LCC) estimates and supporting documentation. The

SPO continually challenged the contractors on the completeness, accuracy, and reasonableness

of source data and assumptions used in developing their LCC projections.

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5.1.1 Total Acquisition Cost for Equipping 1000 Aircraft

Table 13. SPO Counter-MANPADS Baseline Acquisition Estimate

Acquisition Cost Elements

Baseline scenario

Number of aircraft

1000

Installed Countermeasures

$1.14 Billion

Other Acquisition costs

$0.83 Billion

Total Acquisition Cost

$ 1.97 Billion

In constant FY2003 dollars; The average countermeasure cost is

$1.14M over the buy of 1000 systems and is not the same as the cost

of the 1000

unit (the final unit’s cost after a full production run and

associated learning curve application)

Table 13 shows that the total acquisition cost consists of the costs of installed countermeasure

units and “other acquisition costs”. The “Other Acquisition costs” include Research Develop-

ment Test & Evaluation (RDT&E), production start-up, initial spares, and “additional costs” as

detailed in section 5.3.3.

5.1.2 Average O&S Cost for Operating 1,000 Aircraft

Table 14. SPO Counter-MANPADS Baseline O&S Estimate

Average O&S Cost Elements

Baseline scenario

Number of aircraft

1,000

Average cost per flight

$348

Average fleet cost per year (steady state)

$239.7 Million

In constant FY2003 dollars

O&S Costs shown in Table 14 are all costs associated with operating and maintaining the

Counter-MANPADS systems in the field as detailed in Section 5.2.

5.2 Assumptions and Conditions

In this report, we explain in detail some of our assumptions and conditions, while being circum-

spect on other factors. The SPO has been working directly with the two contractors and their air-

line partners to assess costs and the factors impacting those costs. Because a good portion of that

data is proprietary to the developers and their airline partners, we cannot share the details here.

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Table 15. Phase II Summary of Cost Estimating Considerations

Area

Consideration

Rationale

System

Configurations

Each contractor has a two-part system

comprised of an installation kit and a

countermeasures kit (leverage Phase

II configurations).

Minimizes production, installation, and

maintenance costs

Design Maturity

Additional follow-on Research, Devel-

opment, Testing, and Evaluation

(RDT&E) will be conducted beyond

Phase II of the current program.

Additional improvements in weight, drag,

reliability, and manufacturing rate can

reduce production, operations, and sup-

port costs.

Number of

Aircraft

Several scenarios were assessed dur-

ing Phase II; the scenario presented in

this chapter is the 1,000 aircraft base-

line case

The scenario choice for cost illustration in

this chapter focuses on the current U.S.

operating fleet, excluding regional type

aircraft.

Cost

Improvement Curve

(i.e., Learning Curve)

Baseline of 92 percent

Based on the mean for military electronic

systems; system design and efficiency

improvements will vary, depending on the

quantity of units procured.

Deployment

Scheduling

Aircraft will be modified during regu-

larly scheduled heavy maintenance

activities. The deployment scheduling

scenario presented assumes up to

550 per year will be retrofitted.

Minimizes down-time for revenue-

producing aircraft. A nominal schedule for

1,000 passenger aircraft matches existing

heavy maintenance capacity of U.S. car-

riers.

Production Rates

Pre-event deployment, not a post-

event return to flight situation. Maxi-

mum production rates are not

achieved instantaneously.

An attack will result in unknowable policy

decisions. Absent an event, three- to

four-year lead-time to ramp up production

is needed, plus significant industrial capi-

talization costs (not included in acquisi-

tion cost for 1000

unit calculation).

Security

The legacy military technology must

be protected to prevent compromise

and defeat by terrorists or others.

Implementation costs for technical secu-

rity measures are a residual risk in Phase

II. Phase III will refine requirements and

definitize these costs.

Drag and Weight

One percent increase in drag, less

than 500 pounds increased weight

Adversely affects fuel consumption

Reliability

Developers will eventually achieve the

3,000 flight hour reliability metric. Re-

liability impacts the number of sys-

tems and subsystems produced.

Phase II reliability is considerably less,

but the program has a plan to get the re-

liability metric to match typical airline tar-

gets. Until the system reliability is im-

proved, a sufficient number of spares

must be available to offset the reliability

shortfall.

Risks and

Uncertainties

The SPO cost estimates presented

here represent a risk-adjusted com-

posite of the detailed data provided by

the two Phase II contractors.

Variability in the proprietary data provided

by the contractors, plus other risk factors

needed to account for learning curve,

reliability growth, drag and weight im-

pacts, regulatory compliance, and tech-

nology protection.

Confidence

A range of confidence factors are as-

sessed.

Factors like a well-structured competition

could dramatically impact improvements

in cost.

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Area

Consideration

Rationale

Certifications

FAA airworthiness certifications will be

required for different types and series

of aircraft.

The three aircraft types/series certified

under Phase II represent less than five

percent of the U.S. fleet.

Lost Revenue

Some special visits will be required if

normal heavy maintenance schedule

for specific airframes is exceeded.

Special visits for the purpose of install-

ing Counter-MANPADS will result in

lost revenue for the airlines.

Piggyback existing air carrier heavy main-

tenance schedule and minimize build-up

costs of additional capacity.

Inflation

Except where noted, constant FY2003

dollars are used.

Constant dollars for capturing and com-

paring across various scenarios; added

inflation to predict annual costs to exe-

cute program (notional budget).

5.3 Acquisition Cost

5.3.1 Definition of Acquisition Cost

The SPO definition for total acquisition cost is all costs associated with procurement and installa-

tion of the countermeasure systems and “other acquisition costs” to include: research, develop-

ment, testing and evaluation, production start-up, initial spares, and the additional required costs

for the designated portion of the aircraft fleet. The “other acquisition cost” includes the necessary

investments in production facilities to meet the production rates required to satisfy the annual

ordered quantities, including replacement components for failed units returned from the field.

The field return rate is dynamic since it is tied directly to the assumed reliability of the system

through time and the cumulative number of systems fielded. The acquisition cost also includes

the costs for building and installing any necessary test equipment at the air carrier heavy mainte-

nance facilities and depots, the system engineering and program management for both the origi-

nal equipment manufacturers and the airlines, and the technical and maintenance data packages

for each type and series of aircraft (e.g., B747-200, B737-800, and B737-400).

5.3.2 Acquisition Cost Drivers

The primary acquisition cost drivers are:

• The total number of units ordered

• The assumed deployment schedule

• Required industrial capitalization to meet production capacity

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• Number of STCs required (by each contractor)

• Lost revenue due to special visits

The number of STCs and industrial capitalization costs are derived from the number of units or-

dered and the deployment schedule. STC costs are further determined by the number of discrete

aircraft types and series targeted for installation and multiplied by the number of vendors provid-

ing the countermeasure systems. Each aircraft type-series requires either a new STC or an

amendment of a previously granted STC if the type and series is a derivative design of a previ-

ously certified airframe. STCs must be granted by the FAA on any individual type-series of air-

craft, with the initial STCs requiring approximately a nine- to twelve-month lead for design and

approval.

Maximum production rates are not achieved instantaneously. Establishing production rates

commensurate with rapid introduction of Counter-MANPADS systems requires a three- to four-

year lead-time coupled with significant industrial capitalization costs. This assumes a pre-event

deployment and not a post-event “return to flight” situation where the entire U.S. fleet has been

grounded. Finally, system reliability drives required production rates, because acquisition quanti-

ties must be augmented by initial and replenishment spares quantities sufficient to match the reli-

ability rate and achieve the required system availability.

The feasible installation rate depends on the ability of the prime contractors, air carriers, and the

FAA to actually develop and certify installation drawings and documentation packages for each

unique type and series (e.g., B737-300 vs. B737-800 vs. B747-200) of aircraft in concert with the

deployment schedule. Application and granting of the STC and/or amended STCs on any type

and series of aircraft must occur before that portion of the fleet can enter revenue service with

the modification. Additionally, due to the existing domestic capacity to conduct annual aircraft

heavy maintenance visits, the timing of STCs for large fleets, such as B737s and B757s, becomes

the pacing factor in establishing a firm completion objective. The trade-off is to schedule special

out-of-cycle visits to the heavy maintenance facilities and incur the increased cost of lost reve-

nue. The underlying assumption we have used in developing the estimates is that the fabrication

and installation requirements are within the current domestic capabilities and capacities of the

aviation industry. In a post-event return to flight situation where the entire fleet has been

grounded, additional resources would be available, which could increase the installation rates.

To assess the state of the industrial base, each contractor was asked to develop a thorough Manu-

facturing Rate Assessment (MRA). The purpose of the MRA was to explore the hardware pro-

duction/depot rates that might be achievable, plus Counter-MANPADS system installation rates

that could be economically accommodated by the airline industry. In addition to the manufactur-

ing rate and installation rate issues, the analysis of various order profiles provided additional in-

sights into potential implementation strategies.

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Analysis by the SPO of the contractors’ MRA yielded the following significant findings:

•

Scheduled heavy maintenance periods are the most economical time to install the A-Kit

•

Domestic capacity for aircraft heavy maintenance is decreasing. Aircraft heavy mainte-

nance is being increasingly outsourced overseas (e.g., in China, Singapore), which could

create a conflict for ITAR compliance

•

The total U.S. air carrier annual scheduled heavy maintenance domestic capacity is cur-

rently 550 to 575 aircraft

•

Special visits are possible to provide surge capacity, but are costly for setup and may re-

sult in airline revenue losses due to unplanned aircraft downtimes

•

A significant three- to four-year facility expansion effort for both the counter-measure

system manufacturers and the aircraft heavy maintenance facilities would be needed to

meet maximum production rates

•

Maximum required production rate is the sum of both the order quantity and the needed

repair quantity to achieve the required system availability

5.3.3 Acquisition Cost Estimate (For Equipping 1,000 Aircraft)

The key acquisition cost elements for equipping 1,000 aircraft are shown in Table 16 and Figure

13. These numbers do not consider issues such as who will pay to conduct the research to de-

velop additional STCs or to equip the aircraft.

Table 16. Counter-MANPADS System Acquisition Cost Estimates

1,000 Aircraft*

Quantity

1,000

A- & B-Kit & Aircraft Installation

1.14 Billion

RDT&E (STCs, P

I, etc.)**

0.28 Billion

Production Start-up

0.21 Billion

Initial Spares

0.20 Billion

Additional Costs

0.14 Billion

Total Acquisition ($Billion)

$ 1.97 Billion

*In FY2003 dollars, billions.

**P3I = Pre-planned product improvement

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1,000 Aircraft Option $1.97B

14%

11%

10%

58%

RDT&E(Phase III,

STCs, etc.)

Production Start-up

Initial Spares

A & B-Kit & Aircraft

Installation

Additional Costs

Figure 13. Total Acquisition Cost Breakout for 1000 Aircraft

A- and B-Kit and Aircraft Installation. The estimated costs were derived from Phase II actual

costs incurred, post-Phase II projections, and historical costs. The specific costs for the labor and

material associated with fabrication, assembly, integration, and test of the A-Kits and B-Kits

were estimated at the LRU level. The tasks and hours to install the A-Kit and B-Kit were also

estimated. It was assumed that most aircraft installations would occur during regularly scheduled

heavy maintenance aircraft checks. Lastly, a representative 92 percent composite cost improve-

ment curve was assumed for all production cost estimates. The Acquisition cost estimate is com-

posed of RDT&E, production start-up, initial spares, A- and B-Kits hardware, aircraft installa-

tion, and the rest of acquisition costs. The estimating approach for each of these broad summary

areas is discussed below.

RDT&E. This cost area includes the projected cost for the upcoming Phase III efforts (additional

non-recurring expenses, prototype building and installations, reliability growth analysis, and

test/operational flights), potential block upgrades (design and test) due to emerging missile

threats, costs for obtaining STCs (initial and amendments), and applicable Systems Engineering

(SE), Program Management (PM), and Other Government Costs (OGC).

The Phase III costs are based on Phase II actual costs and projected cost per flight to support new

operational test and evaluation flights by two commercial air cargo carriers. The potential block

upgrades are based on Phase II actual costs and represent several additional design and test cy-

cles through Fiscal Year 2018.

The costs for airworthiness STCs are driven by the mix of aircraft for the wide-body passenger

and all-passenger scenarios. As experienced in Phase II, each initial STC is projected to cost be-

tween $2-5 million depending upon aircraft series and applicant. However, the cost of each STC

amendment is projected to be about half the initial STC cost. Since either contractor’s DIRCM

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design could be installed on any aircraft, each contractor would need to obtain all the STCs asso-

ciated with each implementation scenario.

The costs for SE, PM, and OGCs; support by government laboratories; program support; etc.,

were derived based on Phase II actuals and historical factors.

Production Start-up. This area includes all the non-recurring costs for the special tooling and

special test equipment needed to meet the production rate and quantity in the selected scenario.

Production start-up also includes the costs for setting up the supply and maintenance manage-

ment and other logistics related functions.

Initial Spares. The costs for initial spares were derived based on Phase II actuals, post-Phase II

projections, and historical factors as applied against the projected annual production hardware

costs. The level of initial spares is based on the projected reliability of the individual system

components at deployment and the need-date for replenishment spares covered later under the

O&S Phase costs.

Additional costs. The additional costs include the costs for shipping containers and applicable

systems SE, PM, and additional OGCs directly associated with the building and installation of all

the production units in the scenario.

5.3.4 Average Unit Production Cost

An often-quoted cost metric for the program is Average Unit Production Cost (AUPC). The

AUPC varies as a function of order quantity and shows the economic order quantity savings that

accrue to higher order quantities. AUPC is summarized in Table 17 and derived from the SPO-

estimated production costs associated with the installed systems. The other directly applicable

production and acquisition support activities, such as SE and PM, documentation, and data are

not included in the unit production cost estimate.

Table 17. Average Unit Production Cost

AUPC Element

1,000 Aircraft

B-Kit

$1.05 Million

A-Kit & Install Labor

$0.09 Million

Total

$1.14 Million

*Constant FY03 dollars, million. AUPC is the average cost for the

number of systems in the specified scenario, not to be confused with

the 1,000

unit cost metric requirement of $1 million.

The AUPC is influenced by the number of contractors moving forward into production, in this

case a single contractor. The drivers of the cost impacts are elimination of redundant costs re-

lated to manufacturing facilities, manpower, production start-up, initial sparing and supply man-

agement, and system engineering/program management functions. However, this assumes the

costs would not increase due to the lack of competition in the manufacturing base.

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Both the A-Kit and B-Kit costs are based on Theoretical First Unit Cost (T

) and cost improve-

ment curve assumptions across applicable system components (including labor and material

mixes) applied to the commercial aircraft quantity profile. The SPO utilized the historical costs

of the Phase II units as the starting point for T

and utilized a cost improvement curve of 92 per-

cent.

It is important to note that the average unit production cost multiplied by the total commercial

aircraft quantity does not yield total acquisition cost. The average unit production cost values do

not account for certifications, spares, training, support equipment, and OGCs that are incurred

during the acquisition phase and are needed to adequately field and support operational Counter-

MANPADS systems. The costs of the initial spares, technical data, support equipment, change

orders, and the like are then added to the installed countermeasure cost to yield the total acquisi-

tion costs shown previously.

Some acquisition costs, such as SE/PM and FAA airworthiness certifications, would be higher

with multiple contractors because they are required for each contractor producing a Counter-

MANPADS system. Additionally, the cost improvements for each implementation scenario

might not be fully realized since each contractor manufactures only a portion of the total pro-

curement quantity. However, maintaining competition in the industrial base should induce fur-

ther downward pressure on costs. The rationale for the SPO estimates are that the actual acquisi-

tion strategy—quantities, installation rate, funding source—have not been decided. In any case,

significant cost reductions are possible if both contractors move forward into production.

Installed countermeasure cost is comprised of the aircraft integration (A-Kit), the countermea-

sures hardware (B-Kit), and system installation. Figure 14 reflects the progressive reduction of

the initial unit cost as a function of a projected learning curve and the ongoing impact of compe-

tition across several confidence bands. For example, for any given system unit number coming

off the assembly line (referred to as the nth unit in the graph), three costs can be predicted based

on confidence values of 40, 50, or 70 percent which correspond to the assumed learning curve.

As more units are ordered, the cost per successive unit decreases.

The 92 percent value represents a mean for electronics combat equipment as documented in RAND, R-3843-

AF, VHSIC Electronics and the Cost of Air Force Avionics in the 1990s, P.S. Killingsworth, J.M. Jarvaise, Novem-

ber 1990.

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Unit Cost Curve

0.60

0.80

1.00

1.20

1.40

1.60

1.80

2.00

)

70%

50%

40%

Confidence Values

Quantity

Figure 14. Cost Per Installed Units

5.3.5 Acquisition Cost Sensitivities

Besides the hardware composition and installation requirements of the DIRCM system, the pri-

mary parameters that drive the 1,000

unit cost are the quantity of units to be built and installed

and the associated cost improvement curve (or learning curve). Average unit production cost es-

timates, employing several different cost improvement curve perspectives, are shown in Table

18. The SPO assumed that the costs associated with the installation labor will most likely remain

fairly constant (i.e., meaning very little cost improvement) across different installation scenarios.

This is based on the assumption that each airline will procure the A-Kit materials and install the

A-Kit and B-Kit using its own facilities and manpower. As a result, there may be minimal oppor-

tunity for continuous learning-curve improvement for these smaller subsets of the total order

quantity. Because only one or two of the non-airline vendors will produce the B-Kits, those sup-

pliers should be able to maintain continuous learning-curve improvements for the significantly

larger portion of ordered production quantities/costs attributed to the B-Kits.

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Table 18. Cost Improvement Curve Applied to Average Unit Production Cost