"The Russian spy that the American meets today is not a 5 foot 2 inch wide, 5 foot 2 inch tall man in a baggy suit who cannot speak English very well. He is a very suave, eloquent individual who speaks English almost flawlessly. He is probably dressed casually in a modish leather jacket with jeans and a cowboy hat. He knows the American is wary, so he portrays himself as an individual, rather than as a Soviet. He may even bitterly criticize his own country. If the American is a New York Mets fan, soon the Soviet will know more about the Mets than he does. The American will be inclined to think: 'He's not such a bad fellow. He's not trying to coerce me. He's a nice man. So what if he takes me out to lunch?'"

SPIES

Part 1, Section 2 of the "Counterintelligence Awareness Primer", circa 1987

In 1977 Ivan Rogalsky, a former Soviet merchant seaman admitted to the U.S. as a political refugee, was arrested by the FBI in New Jersey and accused of trying to induce an employee of the RCA Research Center to provide him with information regarding highly classified communications satellites and other defense projects. It was discovered that a second secretary of the Soviet Mission to the United Nations was also involved with Rogalsky in the recruiting effort.

In December 1981, Attorney General William French Smith in a speech to the World Affairs Council in Los Angeles stated that the Soviet Union was sending a growing number of spies to the United States under various guises: diplomats, trading company representatives, students, scientists, reporters, immigrants, and refugees.

He said, "Over the last dozen years the number of official representatives of governments with hostile intelligence activities in our country has increased by 400 percent. Although virtually nonexistent prior to 1973, Soviet immigration here has since then amounted to some 150,000. More recently, there has been a vast influx of Cuban refugees who, last year alone, exceeded 100,000. We believe a small but significant fraction of these recent refugees have been agents of Soviet and Cuban intelligence."

Of the more than 4,000 officials from communist countries working out of 180 offices in the United States, between 35 and 40% are intelligence professionals with collection requirements.

According to Arkady N. Shevchenko, Moskow's top UN diplomat who defected to the United States in 1978, approximately half of Russia's 100 member delegation at the UN were spies.

Former FBI Director William Webster recently said, "I do not think there's been another time in our history when our country has been under such a sophisticated espionage assault."

In the VPK program the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB), the Chief Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet General Staff (GRU), and the surrogates among the East European intelligence services are the key collectors of western technology.

The Foreign Intelligence Directorate of the KGB overtly and covertly conducts science and technology operations around the world.

KGB officers occupy such cover positions as science attaches in a Soviet embassy or an equivalent position in an international organization. Frequently, KGB officers work as officials for Soviet trade missions and as members of scientific and academic exchanges.

Among the responsibilities of the GRU, the military intelligence service, is the collection of technical documents and hardware.

All Soviet military attaches are GRU officers.

The GRU uses cover positions in scientific and commercial sections of Soviet missions and international organizations.

GRU officers have positions in Morflot, the Soviet merchant marine, and in Aeroflot, the Soviet airline.

According to Jay Tuck, author of High-Tech Espionage, "The Soviet Airline, which maintains offices in nearly every major city of the western world, is a logical choice for military intelligence agents. Although Aeroflot is widely regarded as a civilian airline, its organizational structure is rigidly militaristic. Most of its personnel have either reserve or former military status. Management hold ranks with equivalents in the Red Army. The top man is a Soviet Air Marshal."

The operational style of the GRU is bolder than that of the KGB. It is estimated that the GRU fulfills up to ten times as many VPK requirements as the KGB.

Both the KGB and the GRU levy some of the VPK requirements on their surrogates among the East European intelligence services.

It is estimated that 30 to 40% of all East Bloc officials in the United States - diplomats, correspondents, and trade officials - are intelligence officers.

In recent years the East European surrogate intelligence services have been more successful than Soviet intelligence services against priority defense technologies in the United States because they operate under less severe or no travel restrictions, and they are frequently perceived to be less of a threat than the Soviets.

The intelligence services of East Germany, Poland, and Hungary are among the most successful in acquiring western technology and export-controlled products.

The acquisition of scientific and technical documents is aggressively pursued not only by intelligence services, but also by other such organizations, as the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade, which maintains hundreds of foreign trade organizations and firms around the world.

Providing cover for intelligence officers around the world, the Ministry of Foreign Trade has become a major independent collector in the VPK program. It fulfills about 15% of all satisfied VPK requirements.

The Soviet Academy of Sciences, the State Committee for Science and Technology (GKNT), and the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations (GKES) are key collectors of VPK requirements, and frequently send representatives to the United States.

According to Ladislav Bittman, "The KGB sends scientists, students, and trade officials to the United States with detailed shopping lists of sensitive equipment needed and wanted by Moscow. American students going to Russia are usually in their twenties with degrees in the humanities, but Soviet students coming to the United States are usually in their thirties, with advanced degrees in electrical engineering or physics."

Although members in these organizations - as well as embassy staffs - may not be KGB or GRU intelligence officers, they are frequently coopted, or pressured, by the KGB into performing intelligence missions.

Representatives of these organizations have the advantage of being able to operate in scientific and academic environments in the West. Altogether they send approximately 10,000 Soviet Bloc citizens to the United States each year in a nontourist status.

The KGB, GRU, and all intelligence services use intelligence operatives that are "legal" and "illegal."

The "legal" intelligence officer operates from an embassy, consulate, trade mission, or other official Soviet establishment. Although his intelligence activities are unlawful, his presence in a country is legal. Most "legals" have diplomatic immunity and escape prosecution for espionage.

The "illegal" intelligence officer uses a cover and operates without diplomatic immunity. He has the advantages of freedom of movement and, more often than not, he is completely unknown to the FBI.

Of the more than 250,000 people recently emigrating to the U.S. from Russia, Cuba, and to a lesser degree from Eastern Europe, a significant number are thought to be "illegal" intelligence officers with specific intelligence missions.

The People's Republic of China (PRC) has placed high priority on recruiting the expertise and assistance of U.S. ethnic scientists and engineers. The PRC has several intelligence services whose personnel are represented among the approximately 1,500 diplomats and commercial representatives located at some 70 PRC establishments and offices in the United States.

PRC Intelligence Services (PRCIS) also have access to approximately 15,000 PRC students and 10,000 individuals arriving in 2,700 PRC delegations each year.

PRC intelligence also seeks to exploit the large ethnic U.S. community.

PRC intelligence activities are markedly different from those of the Soviet Union and its surrogates. The Soviet intelligence services have urgent requirements with respect to U.S. plans, capabilities, and technology. The PRC intelligence services, however, concentrate on acquiring advanced technologies not approved for release to further PRC military and economic modernization.

Despite these differences, the PRC effort to cultivate ethnic Americans in scientific and technical fields represents a significant espionage threat.

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